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Abstract. As the federal government has come to rely increasingly on private companies
to perform government functions, more businesses are testing the power of the resulting
contractual relationships to shield themselves from liability, regulation, and oversight.
Such nongovernmental entities seek the benefit of what we call the federal government’s
sovereign shield by exploiting three doctrines: preemption, derivative sovereign immunity,
and intergovernmental immunity. Because these contractors provide services supporting
every conceivable government action, allowing them to act with impunity puts citizens at
risk across myriad aspects of their lives.
This Article untangles the doctrines that extend the sovereign shield to private actors and
exposes the alliance that such extension enables between the executive branch and
businesses. We explain how this alliance shifts the balance of power in three ways: in
favor of the federal government at the expense of the states, in favor of the executive
branch at the expense of the legislature, and in favor of private enterprise at the expense of
consumers. Using student-loan servicers as a case study, this Article lays bare how
government contractors try to exploit the sovereign shield. And it sounds an alarm about
the consequences of this particular alliance: injured consumers with no path to redress and
destabilization of the principles of federalism and separation of powers.
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Introduction
The federal government is a unique actor in the national economy.
Powerful legal doctrines protect the government from liability for harmful
acts and from regulation by states. As the government has come to rely on
private businesses to perform an ever-increasing number of tasks,1 federal
contractors have sought to expand those legal doctrines to protect their
conduct from oversight and regulation.2 Both the federal government—more
precisely, its executive branch—and federal contractors benefit from this
arrangement: Contractors enjoy liability protection and the federal
government quietly expands the scope of its authority.
As a sovereign, the federal government has the power to preempt state
law, to dictate the limits of regulation of its conduct, and to specify
whether, where, and when it can be sued.3 These benefits—preemption,
1. See PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF

GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT
23-24 (2007) (describing the privatization of the military, public-service obligations,
prisons and state-level services, and agency functions); Jody Freeman & Martha
Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 1-15 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow
eds., 2009); Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors
Share the Sovereign’s Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 179, 18384 (1997) (recognizing that the government has increased its “programmatic
responsibilities . . . to meet societal needs” and that it has “increasingly been looking to
contract with the private sector to carry out all or parts of certain activities
customarily performed by public employees”); Kimberly N. Brown, Government by
Contract and the Structural Constitution, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491, 493 (2011) (“The use
of common procurement and service contracts for routine supplies and maintenance is
uncontroversial. But government contracting is much more audacious, encompassing
some of the most highly sensitive functions within the core responsibilities of
government.”).
2. Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of
Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 924
(2000) (arguing that “political, and consequential scholarly, neglect of the big picture
degree to which third parties . . . perform the basic work of government,” combined
with an “insistence that the basic work of government is, in fact and in law, performed
by officials,” has “limited the application of traditional legal concepts that might order
developments and render third party government accountable”).
3. These powers and immunities generally stem from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . . .”). And while scholars have traced the muddy origin of federal sovereign
immunity to case law, not to the Constitution, see Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal
Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
521, 522 (2003), courts have treated the doctrine as an indirect benefit of the Supremacy
Clause. See id. (recognizing that the sovereign-immunity doctrine developed in part by
“drawing support from some aspects of constitutional architecture”); see also The Siren,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1869) (“The [sovereign immunity] doctrine rests upon reasons
footnote continued on next page
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intergovernmental immunity, and sovereign immunity, respectively—
together form the sovereign shield that protects the federal government from
regulation and legal liability.
There has long been debate about the utility of this sovereign shield.4
Because this Article is primarily concerned with private actors, it puts those
debates to one side, focusing instead on the reach of the sovereign shield.
Government contracting is big business, touching on innumerable kinds of
government action.5 In an era of extensive federal reliance on private means to
achieve governmental ends, we ask how far the sovereign shield does and
should extend to nongovernmental actors—that is, to those businesses
performing “public” work.6 This Article addresses four critical questions: Can
of public policy; the inconvenience and danger which would follow from any different
rule. It is obvious that the public service would be hindered, and the public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of every
citizen, and consequently controlled in the use and disposition of the means required
for the proper administration of the government. The exemption from direct suits is,
therefore, without exception. This doctrine of the common law is equally applicable to
the supreme authority of the nation, the United States.”).
4. That is, for years some scholars have questioned the justifications for and doctrinal
interpretations of any form of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 3, at
538 (observing that “there are very substantial arguments that the principle of
sovereign immunity should have no application to the United States, [and] there are
competing arguments that some aspects of sovereign immunity doctrine—notably,
those relating to judicially compelled payments from Treasury funds—are either
required by, or consistent with, the U.S. Constitution at the federal level” (footnote
omitted)); see also infra note 69.
5. In fiscal year 2018, the federal government spent more than $550 billion on
government contracts, which accounts for approximately 40% of the government’s
discretionary spending. Federal Government Contracting for Fiscal Year 2018 (Infographic),
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.: WATCHBLOG (updated May 29, 2019),
https://perma.cc/KD92-L6AQ; see also VERKUIL, supra note 1, at 23-24. See generally
Freeman & Minow, supra note 1 (explaining the phenomenon and scope of
government outsourcing and identifying attendant legal, economic, and political
concerns).
6. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 717-18 (2010)
(describing the articulated positive and negative aspects of privatization). In a
forthcoming article, we argue that the line between public and private work has been
blurred, even when undertaken by government officials. See Kate Sablosky Elengold &
Jonathan D. Glater, The Sovereign in Commerce, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming May
2021), https://perma.cc/L7ZW-N8QV. There, we argue that the sovereign shield
should be available based on the nature of the work rather than the status of the actor.
Id. Further, we argue that the sovereign shield should only be applicable when the
government or its contractor provides a noncommercial service. Id. And to be clear,
what we mean here by “public” is simply that it is work that the government wants
done. We do not seek to invoke debate over what constitutes quintessentially public or
nonpublic activity, a distinction that has been criticized as fundamentally unworkable.
See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1446 (2003)
(describing the critique that “no principled distinction exists between government
power and private power”).
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the potent doctrines forming the sovereign shield shelter private companies,
contracted to conduct public business, from civil actions? Can they immunize
government contractors from state or federal regulation? If so, under what
circumstances? And what are the doctrinal and normative implications of such
protection?
These are the challenges posed by the expansion of the sovereign shield. This
Article examines federal contractors’ use of the sovereign shield doctrines—
preemption, derivative sovereign immunity, and intergovernmental immunity—
to avoid legal liability and regulation. We find that contractors have relied on
their relationship with the federal government to escape accountability without
precisely defining or distinguishing the sovereign-shield doctrines, using
prevailing doctrinal confusion to push the boundaries of the doctrines.7 Whether
contractors have enjoyed more success when using these doctrines in litigation is
difficult to assess, and we do not here attempt a quantitative analysis. Rather, we
suggest that the attempted exploitation of doctrinal confusion itself constitutes a
meaningful and worrisome phenomenon, whether resulting in impunity for a
contractor in a specific case or not.
The benefits of expanding the sovereign shield do not flow solely in one
direction. Rather, this Article argues that expansion to cover nongovernmental
actors enables and fosters a mutually beneficial alliance between corporate
contractors and the executive branch.8 We argue that this alliance operates to
strip legal remedies from private individuals and state governments and to
impede oversight from state and federal regulators.
These sly, sideways moves reduce the power of individuals and states out of
sight of public scrutiny or democratic accountability. Relationships are
constructed and conduct is protected through private contract negotiations, in
individual courtrooms, or in confidential settlements. When private entities
perform federally authorized functions, they may wholly escape state regulation
and liability under state law as a result. If the contractor performed the same
work for a different client, state power would not yield. But when the federal
government is the client, the sovereign-shield doctrines may be invoked, and the
contractual relationship with the federal government results in a discreet federal

7. Although sovereign-shield defenses are not new, they have seen a recent resurgence.

See Lawrence S. Sher & Peter H. Vogel, Feature Comment, The Government Contractor
Defense—A Call for Clarity After the Supreme Court’s Campbell-Ewald Decision, 58 GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 248 (2016) (pointing to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016), to argue for an expansive sovereign
shield).
8. See Michaels, supra note 6, at 731-33 (noting that the executive branch is the “overseer
of the administrative state” and, as such, is “both the contractor’s principal and also an
agent to the rest of the government”).
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power grab.9 Together, the executive branch and its corporate servants evade
accountability to individual consumers, states, and even other federal overseers
in ways that neither could in isolation. The shield would not function as a matter
of law were the federal government not involved (due to the nature of the
doctrines), and it would not function as a matter of politics if the private
companies were not involved (due to mechanisms of federal-agency democratic
oversight).10 It is the combination of reliance on the private sector and the
potential availability of a sovereign shield that (1) effectively limits the power of
the consumer and the state government; and (2) upsets longstanding balances of
power between consumers and companies, states and the federal government,
and the executive and legislative branches.11
This Article makes three contributions and is thus organized in three
parts. The first contribution is to define and disaggregate the doctrines
underlying the sovereign shield. Over time, parties and courts have
muddled the doctrines of preemption, derivative sovereign immunity, and
intergovernmental immunity. Part I sets out the history and current state of
these doctrines. It then excavates from the doctrinal morass five thematic
factors that courts use to analyze whether the sovereign shield should be
extended to nongovernmental actors like federal contractors. In so doing, it
offers shape and structure for those seeking to apply, or understand the
application of, these doctrines in their current form.
The second contribution is to lay bare how government contractors
attempt to exploit these doctrines to stretch the sovereign shield. Federal
contractors have asserted sovereign-shield theories in as many types of
circumstances as there are federal contracts. A private-prison group operating
under a contract with Immigration and Customs Enforcement relied on
preemption principles to seek to avoid liability under state minimum-wage
9. See Guttman, supra note 2, at 890 (arguing, with reference to the increase of private

contracts in public work, that “[t]he quiet workings of personnel ceilings were
accompanied by bipartisan silence on the changing nature of the federal workforce”).
10. Democratic oversight includes both oversight by the legislature directly and, via
mechanisms such as the Freedom of Information Act, oversight by civil society. See
David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 457
(2008) (warning that “many of the laws and rules that currently require program
information to be made public will not apply to contractors”).
11. This is not the only way to analyze the phenomenon. David Rubenstein, in his
insightful article that explores the ways in which federal supremacy may be exploited
by private actors, warns of the danger that federal contracts alone may preempt state
law. David S. Rubenstein, Supremacy, Inc., 67 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1167 (2020) (describing
“[p]reemption by contract,” in which “a federal statute may not itself conflict with state
law,” but the “federal contract supplies the displacing conflict”). Rubenstein argues that,
because of their effects on federalism, preemption by contract and privatized
immunity defenses should be disallowed on constitutional and normative grounds. Id.
at 1188-90, 1199-202.

974

The Sovereign Shield
73 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2021)

laws in Washington.12 A construction company under contract to do floodcontrol work for the Army Corps of Engineers defended itself against
negligence claims by citing derivative-sovereign-immunity principles.13
Contractors with the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of
Energy asserted various sovereign-shield theories to defend against allegations
of willful, wanton, and grossly negligent conduct in their management of
enriched uranium.14 A United States Navy contractor sought to avoid liability
for seizing two privately owned trucks by asserting that the seizure “was an
exercise of a power to requisition private property for war purposes essentially
inherent in the sovereign.”15 An advertising company under contract with the
United States Navy to send marketing solicitations sought protection from
liability under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by
asserting a derivative-sovereign-immunity defense.16 A bank providing jurorcompensation cards defended against allegations that it had prevented jurors
from receiving full compensation and had charged them outrageous fees by
hiding behind a contract with the Department of the Treasury.17 These are but
a few examples of instances in which government contractors have sought the
benefit of the sovereign shield.18
Part II presents an in-depth look at one particular group of federal
contractors: private entities servicing the Department of Education’s student12. See Washington v. GEO Grp., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 3d 967, 972-73, 976 (W.D. Wash. 2017)

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

(“Defendant argues that ‘uniformity of detention programs’ is a dominant federal
interest precluding enforcement of the State minimum wage laws.” (quoting GEO’s
Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 22, GEO Grp., 283 F. Supp. 3d 967 (No. 17-cv-05806),
2017 WL 11372119, ECF No. 10)). The same entity has also claimed derivative
sovereign immunity under the same set of facts in California. See Novoa v. GEO Grp.,
Inc., No. 17-cv-02514, 2018 WL 4057814, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2018) (order denying
motion to dismiss) (“Defendant argues GEO is immune from suit . . . because GEO was
authorized by ICE to administer the Work Program at the $1 daily wage rate and such
authorization was validly conferred by Congress.”); see also United States v. California,
921 F.3d 865, 878-91 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing the applicability of intergovernmental
immunity and conflict preemption to various California statutes relating to
enforcement of federal immigration law).
Portis v. Folk Constr. Co., 694 F.2d 520, 521, 523-24 (8th Cir. 1982).
Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 960-66 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
Vietzke v. Austin Co., 54 F. Supp. 265, 267 (E.D. Wash. 1944).
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 667, 672-73 (2016).
Scott v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 296 F. Supp. 3d 98, 102-04, 106 (D.D.C. 2017).
Further, it is not just government contractors who use sovereign-shield doctrines to
avoid or evade liability. Noncontractor defendants often point to preemption in an
attempt to avoid state law liability. Patients seeking to take advantage of state
healthcare consumer-protection legislation, for example, have regularly been thwarted
by preemption by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. See Erin C. Fuse
Brown, Consumer Financial Protection in Health Care, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 127, 184-94
(2017).
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loan portfolio. We use student-loan servicers as a case study because the
government–industry relationship and its consequences illustrate the doctrinal
and normative implications of extending the sovereign shield to businesses
acting on behalf of the federal government. This is a timely and practical topic
because federal and state courts and legislatures are currently wrestling with
the application of preemption and immunity defenses to federal student-loan
contractors. It is also a theoretically useful one; student-loan servicers operate
in a highly structured system in which consumers, states, corporations, and the
federal government all inhabit clearly defined roles.
This Article’s third contribution, presented in Part III, is to explore the
normative implications of an expansive and undefined sovereign shield. Our
most crucial observation is that the combination, collapse, and conflation of
the preemption and immunity doctrines have allowed nongovernmental
actors to expand the size and scope of the sovereign shield in ways that serve
the interests of both private businesses and the executive branch, individually
and collectively. Treating the sovereign shield as malleable, these private
actors, with support from their federal-agency partners, have exploited
doctrinal complexity to evade liability under both state and federal law,
regulation by individual states, and even federal oversight. Although even a
single contractor evading liability at the expense of a single consumer is a
problem, that is not our biggest concern.19 Rather, the incoherence of the
doctrine opens the door to a powerful alliance between government and
industry that threatens to destabilize the balance of power in multiple arenas
and leave without recourse those harmed by a variety of products or services.
The question of how to limit the expansion of the sovereign shield is the
subject of a companion article, forthcoming in these pages, that builds on the
diagnosis we offer here.20 In this second article, entitled The Sovereign in
Commerce, we explore potential doctrinal moves to confine the phenomenon
we identify. In searching for a solution, the companion piece uncovers an
uncomfortable truth: The answer does not depend on better distinguishing
public and private actors. In other words, delineating between “public” and
“private” is the wrong approach. We suggest that the analytic difficulty of
fashioning a fix does not arise simply because the federal government relies
increasingly on contractors that assume a dual character. Rather, we argue the
problem is that the federal government has assumed a dual character: It is in the
retail business. Put slightly differently, the problem is not who is doing the
government’s business, but what business the government is doing. It is not the
19. See infra Part III.B (explaining how, even when contractors are stopped from asserting

a sovereign-shield defense in a particular case, doctrinal incoherence continues to
benefit government contractors and their government partners at the expense of
consumers and states).
20. Elengold & Glater, supra note 6.
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identity of the actor but the nature of the action that creates the challenge. If
this analysis is correct, then the appropriate fix rests on proper classification
not of the actor, but of the conduct—a process that the Supreme Court has
undertaken in other contexts.21
Our goal in our larger project is not to attack government contractors or
government agencies for alleged misdeeds.22 Nor is it to suggest that federal
government activities should be limited or constrained,23 or that they should
be provided directly or through contractors.24 Rather, in this diagnostic piece,
we sound an alarm about the ways in which the current doctrinal framework
opens the door to an expansive, ill-defined, and dangerous barrier to
accountability. We warn of the resulting alliance between industry and the
executive branch—what we term an alliance of Goliaths—that threatens
simultaneously to destabilize and undermine the constitutional principles of
federalism and separation of powers and to eliminate avenues of redress for
injured individuals. In our second piece, we suggest a doctrinal response,
separating commercial and noncommercial conduct and proposing increased
liability for commercial conduct.25 We recognize that we cannot fully explore
21. For example, in construing the extent of a federal law’s “sue-and-be-sued” clause as

22.

23.

24.

25.

applied to a wholly owned public corporation of the United States, the Justices
distinguished between the conduct of the business that was “commercial,” which could
sustain a claim resulting in liability, and the conduct that was public, which could not.
Thacker v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 139 S. Ct. 1435, 1443 (2019) (“[S]uits based on a public
corporation’s commercial activity may proceed as they would against a private
company; only suits challenging the entity’s governmental activity may run into an
implied limit on its sue-and-be-sued clause.”). For a full explanation and additional
doctrinal context, see Elengold & Glater, supra note 6 (manuscript at Part IV.A).
With respect to student-loan servicers, those allegations are documented in
complaints and audits. See, e.g., Conditionally Redacted First Amended Complaint for
Permanent Injunction, Civil Penalties, Restitution & Other Equitable Relief at 1-2, 632, People v. Navient Corp., No. CGC-18-567732 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2018)
[hereinafter People v. Navient Complaint].
In fact, scholars have made a compelling case that devolving more power and
responsibility to the states would be problematic. See Miriam Seifter, Further from the
People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 110 (2018) (“Despite the
common refrain that state government is closer to the people, modern state
administration often produces just the opposite effect.” (footnote omitted)).
Debate over the costs and benefits of outsourcing of government activities to private
entities has raged for decades, with proponents extolling efficiency gains and critics
warning of the erosion of democratic values. See, e.g., VERKUIL, supra note 1, at 1-4. See
generally JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2017) (outlining a general history of the modern U.S.
administrative state and arguing against the trend toward privatizing services
traditionally provided by the federal government). But that battle is well beyond the
scope of the present Article.
And in the third and final piece of our larger project, we offer a theoretical framework
for applying sovereign-shield defenses to noncommercial conduct. Kate Sablosky
footnote continued on next page
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in these two papers the sovereign-shield phenomenon, which crosses the
boundaries of constitutional, administrative, and consumer law scholarship.26
Yet our overall project aims to bring an under-studied phenomenon into the
light,27 for the size, scope, and application of the sovereign shield deserve
careful and skeptical scrutiny.
I.

Expanding the Sovereign Shield

When applied to government contractors,28 three doctrines—preemption,
derivative sovereign immunity, and intergovernmental immunity—have been
invoked to extend the protections afforded to the federal government to
private actors based on their relationship with the sovereign. This Part
examines these doctrines.
Each of the three doctrines may stand alone, but in the context of the
sovereign shield they have become intermingled and confused over time.29 For
example, lawyers and scholars generally think of preemption and immunity as
two distinct, unrelated doctrines, and the doctrines do have different histories
and different applications. Private parties unrelated to the federal government
can assert preemption as a defense to an action, while derivative-sovereign-

26.

27.

28.

29.

Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater, Qualified Sovereignty (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors).
For an exposition of how the phenomenon slips through scholarly gaps, see Elengold &
Glater, supra note 6 (manuscript at Part I) (situating our theory and its application
within the broader literature).
See id. (manuscript at 12) (“[T]he aggregate effects of the trends enabling private
businesses to deploy the doctrines that make up the sovereign shield—trends including
increasing privatization and rising levels of political polarization—may have received
less attention precisely because they do not fit neatly into a single scholarly category.”
(footnotes omitted)).
These doctrines have been applied to parties beyond government contractors.
Preemption can be asserted as a defense by any party seeking to shield itself from state
law liability where a federal law has preemptive effect. See Susan J. Stabile, Preemption
of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995)
(“If a federal law expressly or impliedly preempts state law, the state law cannot be used
by a plaintiff to impose liability on a defendant, regardless of whether the defendant’s
conduct in fact constituted a violation of state law and regardless of whether federal
law provides the plaintiff with any remedy.”); see also North Dakota v. United States,
495 U.S. 423, 437-39 (1990) (applying intergovernmental immunity to cover “the
Federal Government or those with whom it deals”). This Article, however, focuses on
how government contractors use their relationship with the sovereign to exploit and
expand the sovereign shield.
This is due, in part, to the effects of “constitutional borrowing” or “borrowing” across
doctrines. See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 459, 461 (2010) (“[C]onstitutional borrowing is the practice of importing doctrines,
rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from one area of constitutional law into
another for persuasive ends.”).
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immunity and intergovernmental-immunity defenses are reserved for parties
with a connection to the sovereign.
Nevertheless, a review of the case law reveals a picture that is considerably
blurrier. This is primarily due to the way that the Supreme Court has
approached sovereign-shield cases. As set forth below, the Supreme Court has
identified the above doctrines in various ways, sometimes tracing ostensibly
distinct doctrines to common sources without clear explanation or guidance.
Lower courts have therefore struggled to apply the sovereign-shield doctrines.
Courts have failed to distinguish between the doctrines or set forth clear rules
or guidance for their application, and principles and precedents cited in
support of one doctrine are invoked to justify outcomes in cases involving
another. Nongovernmental actors, in alliance with their contracting federal
agencies, have taken advantage of the confusion around sovereign-shield
defenses. They fluidly exploit the principles underlying the three doctrines to
arrive at the same end: protecting both the executive and the contractor from
liability and regulation and increasing their individual and collective power.
Mapping the Court’s relevant doctrines is a befuddling task, and scholars
have generally avoided it.30 We take it on. This Part introduces the sovereignshield doctrines, traces their history, and sets out their current operation. We
illustrate the prevailing doctrinal incoherence and seek to unearth common
themes and trends. While we do not make an empirical claim about how often
defendants are successful in invoking any (or all) of these doctrines, the
doctrines’ availability alone is destabilizing.31 We then formulate five factors
distilled from the case law to identify the circumstances in which courts
currently protect private actors from liability through sovereign-shield
30. The most extensive treatment related to these issues is in a recent article by David

Rubenstein. See generally Rubenstein, supra note 11. Rubenstein defines “preemption by
contract” in reference to both preemption and intergovernmental-immunity doctrines.
Id. at 1178-79 (describing the interplay of federal contract, federal sovereign immunity,
and federal legislative preemption in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988)). Rubenstein’s treatment of these doctrines draws on important federalism
literature, introducing the intersection of capitalism and notions of supremacy. Id. at
1137-38. This Article applies a related, but different, framework. Rather than looking
at the mechanisms by which federal agencies can extend preemption to private actors
through contract, this Article looks at the ways in which federal contractors and their
partner agencies have entered into a mutually beneficial relationship to expand the size
and scope of the sovereign shield, which includes, but is not limited to, preemption and
intergovernmental immunity. In so doing, it offers a broader lens—encompassing
power grabs beyond those traditionally understood as federalism concerns—through
which to analyze the problem. In another article, Craig Konnoth focuses on the
intersection of privatization and preemption. Craig Konnoth, Preemption Through
Privatization, 134 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://perma.cc/RAW6-BTC2.
Konnoth, however, does not analyze the interplay between preemption and immunity
defenses or the executive–corporate alliance created by the sovereign shield. Id.
31. See, e.g., infra note 379 and accompanying text.
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doctrines. Although we argue that these doctrines are problematic as they
currently exist, our mapping should be useful to courts and lawyers navigating
the sovereign shield.
A. The Sovereign-Shield Doctrines
Federal preemption doctrine, derivative-sovereign-immunity doctrine, and
intergovernmental-immunity doctrine have become muddled over time. As
applied to nongovernmental actors, both preemption and intergovernmental
immunity trace their foundations to Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, a Supreme
Court case in which an Arkansas licensing regulation was challenged as applied
to a federal government contractor.32 Lower courts also look to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. for application of a particular
form of derivative sovereign immunity generally applied to military
contractors, although the Court’s analysis in that case relied almost exclusively
on notions drawn from the preemption doctrine.33 One judge explained how
these three doctrines have influenced one another to expand the scope of
protection for contractors, observing that “if the authority were validly
bestowed on the contractor and the contractor did not exceed the scope of the
authority so conferred, the contractor cannot be held liable for executing the
will of the sovereign.”34 Put simply: “The United States is extending its sovereign
immunity to the contractor.”35 Courts have also largely collapsed derivative
sovereign immunity and intergovernmental immunity: Under both doctrines,
nongovernmental actors derive the benefits of the federal government’s
authority to avoid suit absent consent.
A wholesale exposition of these doctrines is unnecessary for purposes of
our project. Rather, the important task at hand is to consider whether, when,
and how a government contractor can take advantage of each doctrine. We
therefore trace the development of each doctrine with a specific eye toward its
treatment when asserted by or on behalf of nongovernmental actors who are
acting in concert with the federal government (that is, government
contractors).
To that end, the latter portion of this Part identifies and synthesizes the
factors that courts currently consider in applying the sovereign-shield doctrines
to federal government contractors. By parsing the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, as filtered through the lower courts, we identify five factors upon
32. 352 U.S. 187, 187-90 (1956) (per curiam).
33. 487 U.S. 500, 504-08 (1988).
34. Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Props., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 400, 421 (D.S.C.

1994).
35. Id.
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which courts generally rely to determine whether any sovereign-shield defenses
apply to shelter a government contractor from liability. Although courts’
analyses often conflate the sovereign-shield doctrines, where possible, we call
attention to each factor’s derivation from or relationship to a particular doctrine.
1.

Preemption

Federal preemption of state law rests on the Supremacy Clause of the
Federal Constitution.36 Put slightly differently, when a court concludes that a
state law does not apply because it is preempted by federal law, this resolves a
question of constitutional law. Although there are technically three kinds of
preemption, which we set out below, at the core of the doctrine, preemption
arises when there is a conflict between state law and federal law. When that
happens, the “Supremacy Clause supplies a rule of priority.”37 While one need
not be a government actor, or in relationship with a government actor, to assert
that federal law preempts state law, government contractors can invoke the
doctrine by suggesting that some combination of statute, agency direction, and
contract can be read to preempt state law.38 In this way, government contractors
cite their status as such as a shield against liability. When successful, the result is
that the contractor cannot be held liable for violations of state law.
Courts have recognized both express and implicit preemption.39 Express
preemption occurs when federal lawmakers include in legislation an explicit
statement of their intention to replace potentially applicable state laws.40
Implicit preemption can take one (or both) of the following forms. First, a state
law may “actually conflict[] with federal law,” resulting in conflict preemption.41
Conflict exists when, for example, it may be impossible to comply
simultaneously with the demands of state law and those of federal law. This
36. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
37. Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1901 (2019) (plurality opinion).
38. See David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1147-53 (2012)

(defining and critiquing the ways in which agencies exert discretion in determining
preemption); Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1167-68 (arguing that agency contracts can
operate to preempt state law).
39. Some courts describe two forms of preemption, express and implied (or implicit), and
then treat field preemption and conflict preemption as forms of implied preemption.
See, e.g., Linsley v. FMS Inv. Corp., No. 11-cv-961, 2012 WL 1309840, at *3 (D. Conn.
Apr. 17, 2012) (“Federal preemption of a state statute can be express or implied . . . .”
(quoting SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2007))). Other courts
may begin slightly differently, describing three forms of preemption. See, e.g., Nelson v.
Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., 928 F.3d 639, 646 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Preemption can occur
in three different ways: express, conflict, and field.”).
40. Nelson, 928 F.3d at 646.
41. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
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subtype of conflict preemption is sometimes called impossibility preemption.42
The Court has concluded that conflict preemption may also arise when the state
law at issue “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”43 This so-called obstacle preemption is
more controversial than impossibility preemption because of the risk of
inconsistency and subjectivity inherent in evaluating whether a state law creates
an “obstacle” to a federal purpose and, if so, whether it is enough of an obstacle to
justify preemption. How this assessment is to be conducted is not entirely clear;44
criticism of the doctrine is therefore unsurprising.45 The second type of implicit
preemption is field preemption, which occurs when “federal law so thoroughly
occupies a legislative field ‘“as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it.”’”46
Although the search for preemption seeks to resolve a constitutional
problem, preemption is not analyzed as a distinct, constitutional claim.47 If
Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate as it has, then the critical
question becomes one of intent48: Did federal lawmakers seek to preempt
application of state law or did they not? Whether preemption is proper or
desirable is not a consideration.
This process for allocation of power between the federal government and
the states has concerned some scholars, who worry that courts could quietly
shift the balance.49 Analysis of congressional intent does not require a
42. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009).
43. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.

52, 67 (1941)).
44. The Supreme Court has not particularly helped. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade

45.
46.
47.

48.
49.

Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (“What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment,
to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose
and intended effects . . . .”).
Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 35-43 (2013) (describing
criticisms of the discretion afforded to judges assessing obstacle preemption).
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
Marin R. Scordato, Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 21
(2001) (“[P]reemption jurisprudence does not, in a direct way, involve the court in
establishing, or considering, fundamental limits on the nature and scope of federal
power.”). Of course, courts’ decisions do affect the nature and scope of federal power,
but may do so unobtrusively and without explicit discussion of the federalism interests
at stake. What distinguishes preemption doctrine from, say, Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is that in the case of the former, “[t]he Constitution has already clearly
made and announced the fundamental judgment regarding the relation of federal and
state power: so long as the federal government has the constitutional power to enact
the law, then the federal law is granted supremacy . . . .” Id.
See, e.g., Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., 928 F.3d 639, 647 (7th Cir. 2019).
See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 685, 694 (1991) (warning not only that preemption can “fortify[] the substantive
footnote continued on next page

982

The Sovereign Shield
73 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2021)

reviewing court to consider the possibility that neutering state law may create
a “regulatory vacuum,”50 leaving consumers vulnerable to misconduct that the
state had sought to prevent.
Forays by courts, including the Supreme Court, into determining whether
Congress intended to preempt state law have taken different paths, often
employing inconsistent logic.51 The diversity of opinions has meant that a
discerning reader can reliably predict how a reviewing court will ultimately
resolve any preemption dispute based on the cases cited. If a court will resist
finding preemption, its opinion will likely cite precedential language
emphasizing the general presumption against giving effect to preemption.52
The presumption, if it is recognized, is characterized as particularly strong
when the state has legislated in an area traditionally entrusted to the states,
including areas that implicate the states’ police powers.53 On the other hand, if
a court is going to find that a federal law does preempt state law, it will likely
draw upon language regarding the importance of preventing state acts that
may “frustrate” Congress’s purpose.54
There is no dominant doctrinal resolution to questions of preemption, and
that absence further heightens the risk of inconsistent and subjective or
arbitrary decisions. This risk is at times evident in the Court’s application of
the rules ostensibly articulated in foundational cases, such as Leslie Miller, Inc. v.
Arkansas, involving potential conflicts between state and federal law.55 In that

50.
51.

52.
53.

54.
55.

injuries to the public that flow from misguided or weak national regulation,” but also
that it “is inherently ‘jurispathic;’ it kills off one line, perhaps even an entire scheme, of
a particular community’s law” (footnote omitted)).
Id. at 694-95.
See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 45, at 3 (describing a “plethora of [preemption] cases known
for their lack of consistency, a complex set of crosscurrents, [and] a broad set of subject
matters”). But see Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption
Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 258 (arguing that “the
admittedly divergent results and approaches in the [Roberts] Court’s preemption cases
do not generally stem from confusion, incompetence, or the subordination of legal
principle to result-oriented preferences[, but] reflect, instead, the fact that any
overarching framework of preemption principles must be applied to interpret a range
of quite diverse statutory regimes”).
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 354 F. Supp. 3d 529, 548 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (placing
“consumer protection . . . within the traditional police power of the state” and
consequently applying the presumption against preemption); see also Peete-Bey v. Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 3d 422, 430 (D. Md. 2015).
See, e.g., Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 190 (1956) (per curiam).
See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 452 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the plurality for
mischaracterizing a question of federal immunity as one involving preemption and
warning that “[t]his characterization is not only at odds with the reasoning in the
opinions themselves but suggests a rigid demarcation between the two Supremacy
footnote continued on next page
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case, Leslie Miller, Inc., a private entity, bid for, executed, and began work on a
contract with the United States Air Force for construction at a base in
Arkansas, and the state accused Leslie Miller of violating a state licensing
rule.56 The Court found that the Armed Services Procurement Act of 194757
preempted the Arkansas licensing requirement because otherwise the state
could effectively nullify decisions made under the federal law.58 The Court
reasoned that the state could prevent the federal government from “selecting
the lowest responsible bidder.”59 This case is particularly significant when a
challenged state law similarly restricts the federal government’s ability to
make choices about with whom, for what price, and for what to contract.
As is suggested by courts’ focus on congressional intent, the power to
preempt belongs to Congress. As the administrative state has grown, however,
federal agencies have also sought to use their authority to preempt state law,60
and Congress can effectively “delegate supremacy”61 to agencies.62 Further, the

56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.

62.

Clause doctrines of federal immunity and pre-emption which is not present in our
cases”).
Leslie Miller, 352 U.S. at 187-88.
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, ch. 65, 62 Stat. 21 (1948) (codified as amended
at 10 U.S.C. § 2381).
See Leslie Miller, 352 U.S. at 190.
Id. Intriguingly, from the perspective of contemporary statutory interpretation, the
Justices did not cite a theory of construction that enabled the presumption of the
federal legislative purpose; presumably it was purposivism. The relevant provision of
the federal law, the Armed Services Procurement Act, did not solely state that the goal
of the selection process was to obtain the lowest price. See Armed Services Procurement
Act of 1947, § 3(b), 62 Stat. at 23 (calling for awards to be “made . . . to that responsible
bidder whose bid . . . will be most advantageous to the Government, price and other
factors considered”). Even more intriguingly, the Court in Leslie Miller did not refer to
the concept of preemption at all, but instead cited an earlier case holding that the
“immunity of the instruments of the United States from state control in the
performance of their duties extends to a requirement that they desist from
performance until they satisfy a state officer.” 352 U.S. at 190 (quoting Johnson v.
Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 57 (1920)). Thus, a seminal case on preemption appears to invoke
intergovernmental immunity.
See, e.g., La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
See Rubenstein, supra note 38, at 1126-27 (remarking on the reach of this agency power
and developing an argument that “administrative policies crafted by unelected agency
officials are beyond the Supremacy Clause’s purview” (emphasis omitted)). Rubenstein
also argues, in another article, that government contracts themselves can have
preemptive effect. See Rubenstein, supra note 11, at 1137. Although our Article
considers the arguments that contractors make as to why they are entitled to derived
supremacy based on their contracts, we do not assert that the contracts themselves
have preemptive effect. This Article is primarily concerned with application of derived
supremacy arising from statute, not from contract.
See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (“If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”).
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Supreme Court has recognized that, in certain circumstances, the agency’s
interpretation of whether a statute preempts state law can hold great weight.
The Court has set out the circumstances under which a court should defer
to an agency’s interpretation of federal statutory text, generally concluding
that a court should defer to the agency’s interpretation if that interpretation is
reasonable.63 However, the degree of deference due to an agency’s assertion of
preemption in particular is not clearly settled64 and appears to be contextual.
When an agency interpretation receives less deference—for example, when the
agency is not acting pursuant to legislative instruction to fulfill statutory
gaps65—factors relevant to determining the degree of deference include the
“thoroughness evident in [the judgment’s] consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”66 In
litigation over the District of Columbia’s legislation aimed at the conduct of
student-loan servicers, for example, the trial judge did not defer to the
Department of Education’s assertion that the District’s regulatory effort was
preempted by the Higher Education Act of 1965. This was because, the judge
wrote, the Department’s interpretation took the form of an informal statement
and was not the product of a formal rulemaking process.67 We will return to
the court’s analysis in this case below.68

63. Id. at 845 (explaining that once a court finds that Congress did not explicitly address the

64.
65.

66.
67.

68.

issue addressed by the agency, “the question . . . [is] whether the Administrator’s view . . .
is a reasonable one”).
Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 48 (D.D.C. 2018).
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-32 (2001) (recognizing the difference
between agency actions taken to fill a gap that Congress explicitly or implicitly left the
agency to fill, which are entitled to Chevron deference, and agency actions taken
without any indication that Congress meant to delegate authority to the agency, which
are not entitled to Chevron deference).
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 48-50. The judge reasoned that Chevron
deference, accorded by a court to an agency interpretation of authorizing legislation,
was not appropriate here because the Department of Education had issued only
“informal guidance.” Id. at 48-49. Nor was so-called Auer deference, which is accorded to
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, appropriate. Id. at 49 n.16 (citing
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)). Because the Department of Education’s informal
guidance constituted an interpretive claim about the preemptive effect of its own
regulations, the judge concluded, Skidmore deference—a lesser degree than that
described in Chevron—was appropriate. Id. at 48-49 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 138, 140).
See infra notes 301-09 and accompanying text.
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2.

Derivative sovereign immunity

Derivative sovereign immunity arises from sovereign immunity—federal,
state, foreign, or tribal69—and protects private government contractors from
legal liability when their actions giving rise to an injury were directed by the
government. The general rationales for shielding government contractors from
liability are connected to the purposes behind sovereign immunity itself:
“helping to avoid ‘unwarranted timidity’ in performance of public duties,
ensuring that talented candidates are not deterred from public service, and
preventing the harmful distractions from carrying out the work of government
that can often accompany damages suits.”70 Derivative sovereign immunity is
not absolute.71 A nongovernmental party asserting derivative sovereign
immunity must identify and stay within the bounds of a theory of sovereign
immunity that would protect the federal government were it the defendant.72
69. See Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,” and

Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765,
771-84 (2008) (detailing the four types of sovereign immunity and arguing that courts
have borrowed concepts across sovereign-immunity types). Because the focus of this
Article is on federal government contractors, we focus exclusively on federal
derivative sovereign immunity, which is challenging not only because federal
sovereign immunity has been “described as a ‘ghost[] . . . haunt[ing] the early Republic,’ ”
but also because federal sovereign immunity is the least explored form of sovereign
immunity and “one of ‘the greatest mysteries’ in American law.” Id. at 776 (second and
third alterations in original) (first quoting Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional
Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1381, 1383 (1998); and then quoting Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of Accountability:
Everything I Know About the Sovereign’s Immunity, I Learned from King Henry III, 49 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 395 (2005)).
70. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389-90, 393-94 (2012) (quoting Richardson v. McKnight,
521 U.S. 399, 409 (1997)) (extending qualified immunity to a government contract
attorney sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). For a more detailed explanation of the history
and purposes of sovereign immunity, see generally Florey, supra note 69; and Sabatino,
supra note 1, at 197-201 (setting out the objectives of sovereign immunity).
71. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016). Rather, derivative sovereign
immunity more closely resembles government-official immunity, which is generally
qualified. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1346 (11th Cir. 2007)
(noting that “status as a [government] agent” is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for extending sovereign immunity to private contractors). Absolute immunity is only
extended to private government contractors “in the narrow circumstances where the
public interest in efficient government outweighs the costs of granting such
immunity.” Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1447 (4th Cir. 1996)
(referencing the principles underlying the absolute immunity recognized in Westfall v.
Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959)).
72. See, e.g., McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1353 (rejecting immunity based on the Feres doctrine
because “derivative immunity can be no broader than the sovereign immunity that
grounds it, and the government’s Feres immunity only extends to suits brought by
soldiers”). The Feres doctrine stems from Feres v. United States and holds that the federal
“[g]overnment is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
footnote continued on next page
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For example, government contractors have pointed to a number of theories of
sovereign immunity—some more successful than others—to ground their
derivative-sovereign-immunity defenses: official qualified immunity,73
exceptions to the federal sovereign-immunity waiver in the Federal Tort Claims
Act (the FTCA),74 and the Feres doctrine,75 to name a few.76 This Subpart focuses
on the two primary cases that the Supreme Court has used to create scaffolding
for resolving derivative-sovereign-immunity questions: Yearsley v. W. A. Ross
Construction Co.77 and Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.78
In Yearsley and Boyle,79 the Court offered guidance to help lower courts
determine whether and when government contractors should obtain the
benefit of derivative immunity.80 Under these two cases, private actors enjoy

73.
74.

75.

76.

77.
78.
79.

80.

servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service.” 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
See Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 393-94 (extending qualified immunity to a contract lawyer
retained by the city to assist in an official government investigation).
See In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 341-42, 345 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the
defendant’s assertion that it was entitled to derivative sovereign immunity based on
the “discretionary function” exemption to the Federal Tort Claims Act); McMahon, 502
F.3d at 1352 (declining to entertain the defendant’s assertion that it was entitled to
derivative sovereign immunity based on the “combatant activities” exemption to the
Federal Tort Claims Act).
See supra note 72; McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1339, 1355-56 (recognizing that the Feres
doctrine supplements the FTCA exemptions for tort liability in barring soldiers from
suing the United States for injuries incurred incident to military service, but declining
to extend the doctrine to government contractors).
Not all parties or courts are so careful as to identify and analyze the sovereignimmunity theory upon which the contractor grounds its derivative-sovereignimmunity claim.
309 U.S. 18 (1940).
487 U.S. 500 (1988).
There is a serious question about whether Boyle even belongs in this Subpart or
whether it has been considered primarily (or exclusively) as a preemption defense. See
infra notes 91-105 and accompanying text. Based on our understanding of the history
of these doctrines and our endeavor to unearth and mine the case law for relevant
factors for application of derivative-sovereign-immunity defenses, we place Boyle
alongside Yearsley. While one could legitimately quibble with our placement, it should
not affect the ultimate analysis and usefulness of this exposition. In fact, the debate
reinforces one of the critical premises of this Article—that these defenses are
interwoven, borrowed, and exploited to expand the scope of the sovereign shield,
without those asserting the defenses worrying too much about the original intent and
meaning behind any one doctrine.
See Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21; Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12. There is quite a bit of debate
about whether the doctrines discussed in this Subpart are technically derivative
immunity. Several courts use the term and concept of immunity in applying these
doctrines. See, e.g., Portis v. Folk Constr. Co., 694 F.2d 520, 524 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing to
Yearsley as the “leading case establishing the shared immunity doctrine”); Lamb v.
Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 962-66 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (evaluating
footnote continued on next page

987

The Sovereign Shield
73 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2021)

immunity from state and federal legal claims because of their relationships
with the United States.81 The basic logic is this: “The United States, as
sovereign, is immune from suit” unless it explicitly consents to be sued.82 This
is true even if the sovereign has violated a citizen’s rights.83 When the
sovereign employs a private actor to do its bidding, the benefits of sovereign
immunity extend to that private actor.
the applicability of the defendant’s immunity defenses to a relationship similar to that
in Yearsley and using the term “immunity” when discussing the defendant’s
government-contractor defense despite classifying that defense as involving federal
preemption); McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1343 (pointing to Yearsley as the origin of derivative
sovereign immunity and of the proposition that “a common law agent may sometimes
share in the sovereign immunity of the United States, because ‘[t]he action of the agent
is the act of the government’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 22)).
Other courts have rejected traditional application of the immunity construct. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 627 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the government-contractor defense “allows a contractor-defendant to receive the
benefits of sovereign immunity when a contractor complies with the specifications of a
federal government contract,” and that “the government contractor defense is not a
grant of immunity but is only a corollary financial benefit flowing from the
government’s sovereign immunity” (quoting In re Hanford Nuclear Rsrv. Litig., 534 F.3d
986, 1000 (9th Cir. 2008))); Ackerson v. Bean Dredging, LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 207, 210 (5th
Cir. 2009) (noting that Yearsley did not mention sovereign immunity, but recognizing
that defendants were “entitled to government-contractor immunity under Yearsley”);
Anchorage v. Integrated Concepts & Rsch. Corp., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1008 (D. Alaska
2014) (“[T]his Court does not construe Yearsley to involve derivative sovereign
immunity. Rather, it is a case that accords protection from suit to a private contractor
when it is acting solely at the government’s authority and direction, while expressly
recognizing the potential liability of the government itself.” (footnote omitted)). The
question usually arises in the debate over whether derivative sovereign immunity is
jurisdictional and thus ripe at the motion-to-dismiss phase or for interlocutory appeal,
an issue that is outside the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Ackerson, 589 F.3d at 207-08.
81. See Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21; Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12. The analysis underlying
derivative federal sovereign immunity is similar to, but not as clear as, the analysis
underlying derivative state sovereign immunity and derivative tribal sovereign
immunity. In those cases, courts have identified and applied specific factor-based tests
to determine whether an entity is entitled to derivative sovereign immunity as an arm
of the state or the tribe. See, e.g., S.C. Dep’t of Disabilities & Special Needs v. Hoover
Universal, Inc., 535 F.3d 300, 303 (4th Cir. 2008) (setting out a “nonexclusive list of four
factors” to be considered in determining whether “a State-created entity is functioning
as an arm of the State or its alter ego”); Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi
Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2010) (setting out six factors to
determine whether a “tribe’s economic entity qualifies as a subordinate economic
entity entitled to share in a tribe’s immunity”).
82. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). Federal sovereign immunity “is not
mentioned in the Constitution and was not explicitly recognized by the Supreme
Court until 1821.” Florey, supra note 69, at 776-77.
83. This is because sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional question; it does not turn on the
merits underlying the action. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is
axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the
existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”).

988

The Sovereign Shield
73 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2021)

In Yearsley, the Supreme Court held that a private company was not liable
under an eminent-domain theory because the company was acting pursuant to
a contract with the government of the United States.84 Because the
government authorized the contractor’s action and the authority was validly
conferred by Congress, the Court held that “there [was] no liability on the part
of the contractor for executing [the government’s] will.”85 Although Yearsley
never used the term “immunity,” and courts have called it a “cryptic
decision,”86 it remains the seminal case for deriving immunity from a
contractor’s relationship with a sovereign entity.87 Since the 1940 Yearsley
decision, the Court has held that federal contractors do not “share the
Government’s unqualified immunity from liability and litigation.”88 But the
Court has also recognized that government contractors retain some immunity
as a result of their contractual relationship with the United States.89 To
determine whether a contractor is entitled to this limited immunity, courts
have generally looked to two factors: (1) the relationship between the
government and the contractor; and (2) the nature and extent of the
government’s role in specifying the manner in which the contractor must
perform.90
In Boyle, the Supreme Court looked to principles of preemption to adopt a
new “[g]overnment contractor defense.”91 In that case, the heirs of a United
States marine helicopter copilot brought suit against the defendant
84. 309 U.S. at 19-21.
85. Id.
86. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007); see also

87.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Jason Malone, Derivative Immunity: The Impact of Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 50
CREIGHTON L. REV. 87, 88 (2016) (“For the seventy-six years that followed Yearsley,
courts seem to have languished in a state of confusion and inconsistency in applying a
common law immunity to service-providing contractors.”).
Courts have used different terms for application of the Yearsley doctrine, including
“derivative sovereign immunity,” see In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 34243 (4th Cir. 2014), and “shared immunity,” see Portis v. Folk Constr. Co., 694 F.2d 520,
524 (8th Cir. 1982). Other courts have rejected application of the term “immunity”
when discussing the Yearsley doctrine. See supra note 80. However, the Supreme Court
has seemingly embraced the notion of “immunity” as applied to the Yearsley doctrine.
See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672-73 (2016).
Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. at 672 (emphasis added).
Id.
See infra Part I.B.2.
487 U.S. 500, 504-07, 511-13 (1988). Because preemption undergirds Boyle immunity,
courts do not require a strict principal–agent relationship between the government
and the contractor. See Andrew Finkelman, Suing the Hired Guns: An Analysis of Two
Federal Defenses to Tort Lawsuits Against Military Contractors, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 395,
408-09 (2009) (contrasting the immunity provided by Yearsley with the governmentcontractor defense in Boyle).
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corporation in tort, alleging that the company’s defective design led to the
marine’s death.92 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that where state
law significantly conflicts with federal policy in an area of uniquely federal
interest, the federal contractor cannot be held liable under state law.93 As the
Fifth Circuit subsequently put it, the Boyle doctrine “[s]tripped to its essentials”
is a defense that “[t]he Government made me do it.”94
Although related to Yearsley and the derivative-sovereign-immunity
doctrine, the Boyle decision is regularly discussed in preemption analysis.95 The
Court in Boyle looked to the FTCA to find federal policy in conflict with state
law.96 Although the federal government waives its sovereign immunity for
certain tort actions through the FTCA, it maintains a “discretionary function”
exemption, which protects its discretionary decisionmaking from ex post
judicial review.97 The Court determined that selecting an appropriate design for
military equipment is “assuredly a discretionary function within the meaning” of
the FTCA.98 So long as a government official engaged in discretionary
decisionmaking and the contractor followed the official’s instructions, the Court
reasoned, holding the contractor liable would significantly conflict with

92. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502-03.
93. Id. at 504-07, 511-13. This very much sounds like the kind of analysis conducted when a

94.
95.

96.
97.
98.

defendant argues that a cause of action is implicitly preempted because to permit it
would conflict with a federal objective.
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 620 F.3d 455, 465 (5th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1990)).
See, e.g., In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 342 n.6 (4th Cir. 2014) (asserting that
the defendant’s turn to derivative sovereign immunity, rather than preemption, made
Boyle “inapposite”); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (relying on Boyle to
analyze the defendants’ preemption argument); Goepel v. Nat’l Postal Mail Handlers
Union, 36 F.3d 306, 314 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that Boyle is not a “complete
preemption” case, but noting that it is a preemption case nonetheless); Donn v. A.W.
Chesterton Co., 842 F. Supp. 2d 803, 808-09 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“Any analysis of implied
preemption in the context of Federal Government procurement of military equipment
from private contractors to be used in connection with the national defense—whether it
be field or conflict preemption—must begin with Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.”
(citation omitted)). Even though Boyle relies on preemption principles, which are not
limited to those working in coordination with the federal government, “it appears that
the proximity of contractors to the protected official decisional process provide[d]
protection for the contractor” in Boyle. Guttman, supra note 2, at 914.
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12; see also Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of
Irresponsibility, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1075, 1094 (1996).
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)).
Id. The FTCA explicitly excludes government contractors from its definition of
“federal agency.” 28 U.S.C § 2671. The Boyle Court did not apply the FTCA to the
contractor; rather, it looked to the FTCA provision to find a significant conflict with
state law. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
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uniquely federal interests.99 Thus, in Boyle, the Court created a new kind of
immunity arising out of the preemption model.100 Since 1988, Boyle immunity
has primarily been applied to military contractors,101 but some courts have
extended Boyle to nonmilitary contracts102 and nonmilitary contractors.103
There is much debate about the overlap between Yearsley and Boyle. Some
courts take great pains to separate the two doctrines,104 while others explicitly
conflate them.105 In fact, the doctrines have different conceptual foundations.
Yearsley is rooted in traditional principal–agent concepts and has been applied to
claims arising under both state and federal law.106 Boyle is rooted in the construct
99. Thus, the Court in Boyle found that the defendants met the necessary conditions for

100.

101.

102.

103.

104.

105.

106.

displacing state law: “(1) [T]he United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the
supplier but not to the United States.” Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
This was a slippery move. At a critical juncture in its opinion in Boyle, the Court
acknowledged that “[i]n most fields of activity . . . this Court has refused to find federal
pre-emption of state law in the absence of either a clear statutory prescription or a direct
conflict between federal and state law.” Id. at 504 (citations omitted). But the Court then
turned to “federal common law” to recognize preemption in “a few areas, involving
‘uniquely federal interests.’” Id. (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 640 (1981)). Ultimately, the Court recognized that state law may be displaced—
preempted—when uniquely federal interests are at stake, allowing for a lesser conflict
(one that would not ordinarily lead to preemption) to provide a basis for preemption. See
id. at 507-08. Thus, these doctrines, derivative immunity and preemption, blur.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, has explicitly limited the defense to the context of
military contractors. See Cabalce v. Thomas E. Blanchard & Assocs., 797 F.3d 720, 731
(9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that Boyle does not extend to nonmilitary contractors).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Grumman Corp., 806 F. Supp. 212, 216-17 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (holding
that the defense was applicable when the United States Postal Service procured maildelivery vehicles); see also Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Props., Inc., 854 F.
Supp. 400, 422-23 (D.S.C. 1994) (holding that the defense was applicable for a
nonmilitary performance contract).
See, e.g., Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1118 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the
“government contractor defense is available to nonmilitary contractors under federal
common law”).
See, e.g., Cabalce, 797 F.3d at 731-33 (separately analyzing whether the defendant could
avail itself of either the government-contractor defense of Boyle or derivative
sovereign immunity under Yearsley).
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ali v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 355 F.3d 1140,
1146 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The government contractor defense recognized in Boyle and
Yearsley ‘protects a government contractor from liability for acts done by him while
complying with government specifications during execution of performance of a
contract with the United States.’ ” (quoting McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 444,
448 (9th Cir. 1983))).
See, e.g., Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 2018)
(applying Yearsley analysis to a claim arising under the federal Telephone Consumer
Protection Act); Criscione v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, No. 19-cv-02087, 2020 WL
5912567 (D. Md. Oct. 6, 2020) (assessing instrumentality immunity as applied to claims
footnote continued on next page
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of preemption. Debate over such distinctions, however, is peripheral to the aim
of this Article. What matters is the single thematic factor arising from a close
jurisprudential analysis of both these cases and their progeny: the role of the
government, effectively the principal, in designing and implementing the
specific terms of performance to be followed by the contractor, the potential
agent. In other words, did the government dictate the actions, or did the
government leave them to the contractor’s discretion? If the former, immunity
may attach to the contractor; if the latter, immunity is likely unavailable.
3.

Intergovernmental immunity

The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, which traces its roots to the
Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis in McCulloch v. Maryland,107 declares
that states “have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden,
or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by
Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general
government.”108 In other words, states cannot regulate or discriminate against
the federal government.109 Since 1819, the Supreme Court and lower courts
have looked to the intergovernmental-immunity doctrine to analyze the
constitutionality of a number of state tax levies, including, for example,
shareholder taxes,110 sales taxes,111 use taxes,112 and pension taxes.113 Although

107.
108.
109.

110.
111.

112.

113.

arising under the federal Energy Reorganization Act); Portis v. Folk Constr. Co., Inc, 694
F.2d 520, 524 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing to Yearsley and the doctrine of “shared immunity” to
determine whether the defendant could face liability under Arkansas negligence law);
Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 204 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
defendants were entitled to immunity under Yearsley for claims arising under state law).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425, 436 (1819) (holding that Congress has the power to
incorporate a national bank and that a state cannot constitutionally tax its branches).
Id. at 436.
See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Movassaghi, 768 F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2014). The doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity also applies when there is a conflict between other
entities with sovereign immunity: foreign governments, tribal governments, and state
governments. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1498 (2019). This
Article, however, is exclusively focused on the intergovernmental immunity that
arises when state actions affect federal interests.
See Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 359-63 (1870) (considering whether a
state can tax bank stock when the tax is collected directly from the bank).
See Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 6-9, 14 (1941) (considering whether the
application of a state sales tax on a supplier to the federal government “infringe[d] any
constitutional immunity of the United States from state taxation”).
See United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 485, 487 (1958) (considering
whether a township could levy a property tax against a contractor using governmentowned land).
See Dawson v. Steager, 139 S. Ct. 698, 702-04 (2019) (considering whether a state could
exempt from taxes the pension benefits of certain former state and local lawfootnote continued on next page
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sometimes called “intergovernmental tax immunity,” the doctrine has not been
limited to taxation. The Court has also invoked the doctrine to assess state
regulation of health,114 safety,115 environmental standards,116 and economic
well-being.117 As with preemption and derivative sovereign immunity, private
parties can assert intergovernmental immunity as a defense to an alleged
statutory violation where that statute arguably regulates the federal
government.118
After a careful review of the jurisprudence, we have identified particular
themes that courts discuss as relevant to their derivative-intergovernmentalimmunity analysis. The first set of themes is connected to the contracted work
that the state law seeks to regulate. These themes include the character of the
contractor and the government’s role in overseeing the public project. The
second set of themes is connected to the kind of state regulation sought to be
enforced. These themes include congressional intent regarding the role of the
state and the state’s effective control of the government.
We begin with the first set of themes. The Supreme Court has recognized
that, when the federal government turns to the private sector for assistance—
because the private sector provides expertise, experience, and efficiencies, for
example—the benefits of the private sector come with the downsides. In other
words, immunity does not automatically flow to the contractor. In United
States v. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board, for example, the Third
Circuit found that a government contractor could not claim immunity from

114.

115.

116.

117.

118.

enforcement employees without also exempting the benefits of former federal lawenforcement employees). For a thorough mapping and analysis of the application of
intergovernmental immunity in the tax context, including a recognition that the law
of intergovernmental immunity has been anything but straight and clear, see THOMAS
REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 88-141
(The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2002) (1956).
See Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 277-78, 283 (1899) (considering whether a state’s
health standards for oleomargarine could be extended to a federally owned eating
house for disabled volunteer soldiers).
See Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55-57 (1920) (considering whether a state could
arrest an employee of the United States Postal Office for driving without the required
state license).
See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 168, 198-99 (1976) (considering whether Kentucky’s
implementation of the Clean Air Act was applicable to federal facilities located in the
state), superseded by statute, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 116,
91 Stat. 685, 711 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7418).
See Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm’n, 318 U.S. 261, 266, 269-71 (1943)
(considering whether a state’s minimum-price regulations for milk were constitutional
as applied to milk dealers selling to federal installations).
See infra notes 311-13, 327-29 and accompanying text (explaining how the
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA) asserted the doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity to avoid liability under state statutes).
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civil penalties for violating state environmental laws when the federal
government “deliberately opted for the ‘genius’ of private enterprise in the
operation of” its Scranton plant.119 Because the government “enjoy[ed] the
benefits that are derived from private operation . . . it must also suffer any
reciprocal burdens,” including “compliance with state pollution regulations.”120
Thus, in assessing whether intergovernmental immunity might attach to the
nongovernmental actor, courts evaluate the character of the contractor and
the government’s goals in turning to the private sector.
The second set of themes—involving whether Congress intended to allow
states to play a role in controlling or implementing federal law—is connected
to the kind of regulation sought to be enforced. These themes are also
connected to field preemption, the question of whether Congress intended to
occupy the field fully.121 Issues of field preemption are opaque, but they turn
on Congress’s express or implied intent and whether, if a state may regulate the
federal government, that state effectively controls the federal enterprise.
B. Pulling Together the Five-Factor Framework
Subpart A set out the doctrinal outline of preemption, derivative
sovereign immunity, and intergovernmental immunity, while recognizing
119. 584 F.2d 1273, 1279 (3d Cir. 1978).
120. Id. This is not unique to the intergovernmental immunity context. In Powell v. United

States Cartridge Co., the Court held that federal labor laws applied to private companies
contracted to operate federal ordnance plants in Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas. 339
U.S. 497, 498-99, 502-04 (1950), superseded by statute, Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 401, 80 Stat. 830, 841-42 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 207). Looking at the operations contracts, the Court noted “a reflection of the
fundamental policy of the Government to refrain, as much as possible, from doing its
own manufacturing and to use, as much as possible (in the production of munitions),
the experience in mass production and the genius for organization that had made
American industry outstanding in the world.” Id. at 506.
121. See Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 46, 55-56
(D.D.C. 2018) (noting that the “intergovernmental immunity doctrine provides the
federal government a minimum level of constitutional protection, but Congress can
provide a ‘further degree of immunity’ by acting to preempt a state law or regulation
that would otherwise be constitutionally permissible,” and further noting that to
ascertain whether Congress has taken the preemptive step, courts consider “the
substantive nature and reach of the federal regulatory scheme that Congress [has]
adopt[ed]” (first quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 435 (1990); and
then quoting Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., LLC, 884 F.3d 338, 346 (D.C. Cir.
2018))). The role of congressional intent came to a head in the milk-price-control
context. Compare Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm’n, 318 U.S. 261, 278-79
(1943) (holding that a state milk-control law could constitutionally be applied to
military-encampment suppliers), with Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 254-55 (1963)
(holding that a similar law was now unconstitutional because, in the intervening years,
Congress “revised and restated the federal procurement policy . . . [for] the War and
Navy Departments”).
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that, over time, the doctrines have been collapsed and interwoven. Like others,
we recognize that these doctrines are in a state of disarray.122 Even so, courts
must decide cases. Therefore, it is critical to understand the factors that courts
currently use to determine whether to apply the sovereign shield to
government contractors. This Part identifies five factors that courts have used
to analyze sovereign-shield defenses asserted by nongovernmental actors.
The five factors are: (1) congressional intent; (2) the character of the
contracted institution and its contract; (3) the discretion of the contractor;
(4) the contractor’s adherence to the precise terms of the contract; and (5) the
actual or potential impact of state regulation on federal policymaking and
decisionmaking. These factors arose again and again in our review of case law
grappling with the application of the sovereign shield to nongovernmental
actors. Where relevant, we also point out subfactors that have facilitated
courts’ analyses of one of the five factors.
These five factors are distilled from a century of case law, established by
the Supreme Court and implemented by lower courts, but they have not been
articulated as a test by any court. The identified factors both overlap and work
together. In that way, even though different sovereign-shield doctrines may
seemingly turn on some factors rather than others, in application, the factors
operate similarly and rest on the same sorts of factual observations. We
therefore treat the factors as a single set relevant to the sovereign-shield
defenses generally. No one factor appears to be sufficient on its own to
guarantee application of the sovereign shield.
1.

Congressional intent

The first factor is congressional intent. Courts consider whether Congress
intended to shield nongovernmental actors from liability by preempting state
law or extending immunity to those actors. This factor is particularly
important for preemption, Boyle-immunity, and intergovernmental-immunity
defenses.
Discerning legislative intent is easiest when lawmakers address the
possibility of preemption or immunity explicitly. So courts look to see
whether a federal statute expressly preempts state law, such that a state law
122. See Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.

69, 70-71 (1988) (“Although the Supreme Court has referred to four categories of
preemption in almost every one of its recent preemption cases, the categories are
useless in difficult cases.” (footnote omitted)); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 345 (“The
most plausible explanation of the repeated frustration of judicial intervention in the
area of state-national relations is the failure of judges and scholars to produce a viable
theory of federalism that would help to develop workable principles for the judicial
resolution of federalism-related disputes.”).
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claim cannot lie against the contractor, or extends immunity such that the
court would have no jurisdiction over the contractor. Such an inquiry should
be self-evident, in that the federal statute contains (or does not contain)
language prohibiting the application of state law.123 More difficult to identify
are instances of implicit preemption. One form of implicit preemption is field
preemption, which courts find when the federal government completely
dominates an area such that potentially competing authorities must be
excluded.124 This determination requires a court to assess whether Congress
has legislated so comprehensively that states have no regulatory space left, as
the Court has found with certain aspects of immigration law125 and federal
energy regulation.126 In addition to explicit preemption and Boyle-immunity
defenses, field preemption is also relevant to intergovernmental-immunity
defenses.127
The question of implicit preemption becomes most difficult, and the
reasoning potentially most controversial, in the realm of conflict preemption,
when a court finds that state law puts an obstacle in the way of a federal
objective. This should not be surprising, because the court must pose and
answer an unanswerable question. As David Dana has put it, that question is, “if
Congress had spoken directly and unambiguously to the precise preemption
question at hand, which it did not, what would it have said?”128 Given the level
of indeterminacy in this question, Dana observes that “it is hard to resist the
conclusion that ‘congressional intent’ in an implied preemption case often
reflects more than anything else the deciding court’s vision as to what kinds of
state laws it thinks would harm, obstruct, or frustrate federal law.”129
123. But see Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517-18 (1992) (finding clear

124.

125.
126.

127.

128.
129.

congressional intent to preempt state law, but then engaging in further analysis to
“identify the domain expressly pre-empted”).
See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401, 415 (2012) (holding that the federal
government had “occupied the field of alien registration” such that state legislative
efforts were preempted, but also holding that a specific state law requirement might
nevertheless survive if it could be “construed in a way that [does not] create[] a conflict
with federal law”).
Id. at 401.
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016). The Court here found
that Maryland impermissibly trespassed on the federal domain in the context of
energy regulation. Id.
Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm’n, 318 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1942) (noting judicial
reluctance to extend federal immunity to state tax and regulatory authority and
indicating that the “inquiry . . . must be whether the state’s regulation of this contractor
in matter of local concern conflicts with Congressional legislation or with any
discernible Congressional policy”).
David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 507, 510
(2008).
Id.
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This conundrum makes recourse to the statutory text even more
significant to a court’s analysis. For example, as some courts have concluded
when declining to find preemptive effect, the choice of Congress to include
express preemption language in some provisions but not in others is
compelling evidence that lawmakers generally did not intend to restrict state
involvement.130 This rests on the canon of construction expressio unius est
exclusio alterius: to express one is to exclude the other.131 Had Congress wished
to give federal law preemptive effect, they certainly knew how to do so, and if
they did not do so, that means they did not wish to do so.
That is not the end of the analysis, however, because there is also a wellrecognized, though inconsistently adhered-to, presumption against finding
federal preemption, especially in those spheres traditionally regulated by the
state.132 The police power, which includes the power to protect consumers
from economic harm, is one of those spheres.133 Thus, while congressional
silence in isolation is insufficient to overcome a finding of preemption, when
bolstered by this presumption, the case for preemption is further weakened.
To the extent that federal agencies assert their authority to claim
preemption, doctrine allows for consideration of the agency’s views, with
proper skepticism if an agency either acts without due care or changes position
on an issue without adequate explanation.134 The Supreme Court has allowed
130. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574-75 (2009) (recognizing that Congress had

131.

132.

133.

134.

not enacted an express preemption provision for prescription drugs in the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, even where it did so for medical devices, and noting
that “[i]ts silence on the issue, coupled with its certain awareness of the prevalence of
state tort litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight
to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness”); Nelson v. Great
Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 648 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he several specific
preemption provisions in the HEA weigh against attributing to Congress a desire to
preempt state law broadly. The specific preemption provisions show that Congress
considered the issue of preemption and decided to preempt on particular topics.”).
See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (relying on expressio
unius in its preemption discussion); Pub. Health Tr. of Dade Cnty. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc.,
992 F.2d 291, 294-95 (11th Cir. 1993) (same).
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (“[I]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which
Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ . . .
we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.’ ” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Medtronic v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996))).
Id.; see also Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 47
(D.D.C. 2018) (applying the presumption against preemption in a case related to
“[c]onsumer protection,” an “area that traditionally has been regulated by the states”);
Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 104, 117 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying the presumption in a
consumer suit).
See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125-26 (2016).
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for varying degrees of deference depending on the process that produced the
agency interpretation. The often-cited formulation comes from Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in which the Court described
circumstances where a regulatory agency’s interpretation of a statute should
garner deference: (1) if the statute is ambiguous; and (2) the agency’s analysis is
“based on a permissible construction of the statute.”135 But Chevron deference “is
warranted only ‘when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.’”136 If Chevron does not apply, an agency interpretation is “‘entitled
to respect’ only to the extent it has the ‘power to persuade,’”137 and the more
process that went into generating the interpretation, the more persuasive a
court is likely to find it.138
2.

Character of the contracted institution and its contract

In determining whether a private actor is subject to liability
notwithstanding a contractual relationship with the federal sovereign, courts
regularly consider: (1) the character of the contracted institution, (2) the
defined relationship between the contractor and the government, and (3) the
kind of contract. These subfactors hold particular import in the context of
derivative-sovereign-immunity and intergovernmental-immunity defenses.
The first subfactor is the “character” of the institution seeking
immunity.139 The Supreme Court, in early cases including McCulloch v.
Maryland, explained that immunity should be extended to public
corporations created for “national purposes.”140 Such public corporations

135. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). The standard may be even lower—meaning a court’s degree of

136.
137.
138.

139.
140.

deference may be greater—when an agency interprets its own regulations. See Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)).
Id. at 256 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (explaining that the degree of deference “will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in [the judgment’s] consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”).
See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 867-68 (1824) (holding that the
Bank of the United States was not subject to the taxing powers of the State of Ohio).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409, 411, 436 (1819) (“The power of
creating a corporation is never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of effecting
something else.”). The Bank of the United States itself was an unusual type of
government instrumentality, with “ownership of stock divided between the United
States and private persons.” POWELL, supra note 113, at 90-91.
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have included the Bank of the United States and its branches,141 housing for
disabled volunteer soldiers,142 and the U.S. Post Office Department.143 Public
corporations created for national purposes are not the same as private
corporations that provide supplies or services to the United States via
contract. Thus, Chief Justice Marshall distinguished the Bank of the United
States, which was “not considered as a private corporation, whose principal
object is individual trade and individual profit; but as a public corporation,
created for public and national purposes,” from a “mere private corporation,
engaged in its own business, with its own views.”144 “[T]he casual
circumstance of [the latter] being employed by the government in the
transaction of its fiscal affairs, would no more exempt its private business
from the operation of [the taxing] power, than it would exempt the private
business of any individual employed in the same manner.”145 Today,
although many public corporations are governed by so-called sue-and-besued clauses in their authorizing legislation,146 private corporations
operating as government contractors are not so governed. Lower courts
therefore continue to consider whether a defendant contractor performs an
“important governmental function” in assessing whether the contractor can
benefit from the sovereign shield.147
Second, because the benefits of the sovereign shield should only flow to
nongovernmental entities that are doing the government’s bidding,
courts look to whether the contracted institution is an instrumentality, arm,
or agent of the federal government.148 While not dispositive by
141. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436; Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 867-68.
142. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 283 (1899).
143. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55-57 (1920).
144. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 859.
145. Id. at 859-60.
146. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988).
147. See United States v. Michigan, 851 F.2d 803, 806 (6th Cir. 1988) (“One significant factor

in determining whether a particular entity is a federal instrumentality is whether it
performs an important governmental function.”); Davis v. Mgmt. & Training Corp.
Ctrs., No. 98-4175, 2000 WL 1701773, at *4-5 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2000) (assessing the
defendant contractor’s role in performing important governmental functions in
evaluating a preemption claim, and cataloging similar cases).
148. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 860 (noting that the opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland
rested on the Court’s conclusion that the Bank of the United States was an “instrument”
that was “necessary and proper for carrying into effect the powers vested in the
government of the United States”); Thomas, 173 U.S. at 283 (observing that the
defendant was engaged in “superintending the internal government and management
of a Federal institution, under the lawful direction of its board of managers and with
the approval of Congress”); Johnson, 254 U.S. at 55-56 (recognizing that McCulloch dealt
with the states’ power to tax the “instrumentalities” of the United States); Curry v.
United States, 314 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1941) (holding that government suppliers were not
footnote continued on next page
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itself,149 courts have generally declined to extend immunity to, for example,
private actors or entities that do not rise to the level of a federal government
“instrumentalit[y]”150 or “‘servant’ of the United States in agency terms.”151
Today, courts continue to recognize that there is no “bright line rule or
specific test” to determine whether a nongovernmental entity is a federal
instrumentality, relying instead on “various factors to aid their
determination.”152
The character of the institution—whether it rises to the level of an agent
or instrumentality of the United States—is intimately related to the kind of
relationship it holds with the federal government. Courts have looked to
contractual language to determine whether the contractor should be treated as
an extension of the government for immunity purposes.153 For example,
in United States v. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board,154 the
contractors’ status as “independent contractors” weighed against extending
intergovernmental immunity.155 The court was particularly hesitant to apply

149.
150.
151.

152.

153.

154.
155.

immune from state taxation in part because they were not “agents or instrumentalities
of the Government”); United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 48 (1964) (holding that
contractors had not “been so incorporated into the government structure as to become
instrumentalities of the United States and thus enjoy governmental immunity”);
Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 963 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (citing
Boyd in rejecting the defendant’s derivative-sovereign-immunity defense); Hamm v.
Boeing Co., 216 So. 2d 288, 291 (Ala. 1968) (recognizing, in assessing intergovernmental
immunity, that “the critical question becomes one of determining what the
relationship is between the United States Government and government contractor
with respect to the purchase of tangible personal property”).
See infra notes 152-56.
See Lamb, 835 F. Supp. at 963 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (citing Boyd, 378 U.S. at 48).
United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958); see also Mount Olivet
Cemetery Ass’n v. Salt Lake City, 164 F.3d 480, 486 (10th Cir. 1998) (“There is no bright
line rule or specific test to determine if an entity is a federal instrumentality.”); United
States v. Jackson County, 696 F. Supp. 479, 484 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (distinguishing
Muskegon by pointing to its language recognizing that a tax might be unlawful if the
contractor was a “servant” of the United States).
Tewelde v. Albright, 89 F. Supp. 2d 12, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that the American
Embassy Association (AEA) was not a federal instrumentality for purposes of holding
the Department of State liable for AEA’s alleged discriminatory acts); see also United
States v. Michigan, 851 F.2d 803, 806 (6th Cir. 1988) (considering whether an entity was
a federal instrumentality for purposes of intergovernmental tax immunity); Jackson
County, 696 F. Supp. at 484 n.3.
This is consistent with application of the FTCA to government contractors. While the
FTCA explicitly excludes contractors from the definition of “federal agency,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2671, a contractor can nevertheless be considered an employee for FTCA purposes if
the federal government oversees and controls the day-to-day performance of the
contract. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813-15 (1976).
584 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1278-79; see also supra note 120.
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the sovereign shield because the government turned to the private sector for
its innovation, efficiency, and expertise.156 Similarly, under the agency
principles underlying Yearsley immunity, courts have looked to see if the
contractor is hired as an “independent contractor,” expected to use its expertise
and discretion to decide how best to get the job done, or as something more
akin to an agent of the United States, just following orders.157 We discuss this
idea further in the Subpart that follows. Courts also look to the payment
structure defined in the contract as a signal. In both Powell v. United States
Cartridge Co. and Alabama v. King & Boozer,158 the contractors’ use of a “costplus-a-fixed-fee” payment structure militated against the extension of
immunity because such a fee structure signaled a separation between the
government and the contractor.159 This analysis has been similarly employed
by the lower courts.160
3.

Discretion of the contractor

The third factor is whether a federal contractor retains discretion in the
implementation of the contract. This factor is a primary concern for
derivative-sovereign-immunity defenses arising under either Yearsley or Boyle.
It can also become relevant to intergovernmental-immunity assertions. If the
contractor retains authority to determine how to implement the contract, then

156. See Pa. Env’t Hearing Bd., 584 F.2d at 1279.
157. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing

Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010, 1015 (5th Cir. 1969)) (“[T]o make out
a claim of derivative sovereign immunity in this circuit, the entity claiming the
immunity must at a bare minimum have been a common law agent of the government
at the time of the conduct underlying the lawsuit.”); Cabalce v. Thomas E. Blanchard &
Assocs., 797 F.3d 720, 732-33 (9th Cir. 2015) (declining to confer derivative immunity to
a federal contractor because the contractor “did not plausibly demonstrate that it
completely lacked discretion” in its work).
158. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
159. Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 506-07 (1950), superseded by statute, Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 401, 80 Stat. 830, 841-42 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 207); King & Boozer, 314 U.S. at 13-14; see also 48 C.F.R.
§ 16.306(a) (2019) (“A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that
provides for payment to the contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed at the inception
of the contract. The fixed fee does not vary with actual cost, but may be adjusted as a
result of changes in the work to be performed under the contract. This contract type
permits contracting for efforts that might otherwise present too great a risk to
contractors, but it provides the contractor only a minimum incentive to control
costs.”).
160. Whitaker, 418 F.2d at 1014 (rejecting the defendant’s attempts to take advantage of
derivative-sovereign-immunity protection in reliance on the analysis of the Court in
Powell); Durnil v. J. E. Dunn Constr. Co., 186 F.2d 27, 29 (8th Cir. 1951) (same).
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they are acting outside of the zone of conduct protected by the sovereign
shield.
There are two principal inquiries. First, did the contractor lack sufficient
discretion in its actions such that it is appropriate to treat the contractor’s
action as government action? If the contractor retained discretion in
implementing the contract terms, courts are unlikely to extend sovereign
benefits to the private actor.161 If the contractor lacked discretion, courts ask a
second question, which is the subject of the next Subpart: Did the contractor
exceed its authority under the contract?
The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Cunningham v. General Dynamics
Information Technology, Inc. is instructive in exploring what it means for a
government contractor to lack discretion in developing and implementing a
contract.162 In Cunningham, the federal government, through the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), contracted with defendant General
Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT) to call applicants to inform them
of their rights under the Affordable Care Act.163 CMS told GDIT exactly when
to call (over a set five-day period), whom to call (approximately 2.65 million
numbers), in what order to call (CMS divided the numbers into seven lists and
specified which numbers to call on which days), and what to say (CMS
provided scripts for each call).164 When a putative class brought suit against
GDIT for violating the TCPA, the Fourth Circuit ruled that, because GDIT had
“performed exactly as CMS directed,” it was entitled to immunity from suit
pursuant to the Yearsley doctrine.165
This is consistent with other courts’ analyses of contractors’ discretion. In
Cabalce v. Thomas E. Blanchard & Associates, for example, the Ninth Circuit held
that a government contractor could not take advantage of Yearsley immunity
where the contractor “did not plausibly demonstrate that it completely lacked
discretion” (that is, the contractor did have discretion) in implementing its
contract.166 The court noted a lack of evidence that any “government
employee or agency controlled or substantially supervised the day-to-day”
work under the contract and reiterated that “derivative sovereign immunity,
as discussed in Yearsley, is limited to cases in which a contractor ‘had no

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See, e.g., Cabalce, 797 F.3d at 732-33.
See 888 F.3d 640, 647-49 (4th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 643-44.
Id. at 644.
See id. at 647-49 (finding that the government “validly conferred . . . authorization” for
GDIT to undertake the challenged action).
166. 797 F.3d at 733.
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discretion in the design process and completely followed government
specifications.’”167
The focus on discretion (or lack thereof) is also consistent with courts’
application of Boyle immunity and intergovernmental immunity, and it echoes
fundamental agency principles that make a principal liable for the actions of an
agent that acted on instructions. Under Boyle, immunity is appropriate if “the
discretion over significant details and all critical design choices will be
exercised by the government.”168 For example, where government oversight
focused on the cost of a material but not its composition, a court found that the
government did not exercise sufficient oversight to shield the contractor
from composition-related liability.169 Directives that are not at least
“reasonably precise” are insufficient170: Providing only general directives,
without more specific instructions, allows a contractor significant discretion,
which undercuts the contractor’s demand for immunity.171 And in the
intergovernmental-immunity context, courts look to the role of federal
government agents or officials in implementing the work of the contract. For
example, in Ohio v. Thomas, the Court extended immunity to the overseer of a
government-owned eating house because the federal government maintained
control of every aspect related to the issue at hand: regulation of
oleomargarine.172 The Court recognized that Congress had included “detailed
estimates for rations to be furnished the inmates, and that the appropriation
for rations included oleomargarine as part thereof.”173 Therefore, Congress “in
effect provided oleomargarine as part of the rations for the inmates of the
home.”174 In contrast, in United States v. Township of Muskegon, the Court
deemed constitutional a state tax imposed on a federal government lessee
because the Court recognized the corporate activities at the property, noted
167. Id. at 726, 732 (first quoting Cabalce v. VSE Corp., 922 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1116 (D. Haw.

168.
169.
170.

171.

172.
173.
174.

2013); and then quoting In re Hanford Nuclear Rsrv. Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1001 (9th Cir.
2008)).
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 620 F.3d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Trevino v.
Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1481 (5th Cir. 1989)).
In re Katrina, 620 F.3d at 461-63.
See id. at 464-65; Davis, supra note 96, at 1099 (arguing that courts have adopted overly
expansive readings of “reasonably precise specifications” in applying Boyle to
subsequent fact patterns (quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512
(1988))).
In re Katrina, 620 F.3d at 464-65 (“By providing only general instructions regarding the
compaction method, the [government] ensured that [the contractor] would have
significant discretion over the method chosen. The exercise of that discretion by [the
contractor] is not protected by the [government-contractor-immunity] doctrine”).
173 U.S. 276, 282 (1899).
Id.
Id.
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that the government did not reserve necessary control over the activities and
financial gain of the lessee, and concluded that the lessee was “free within broad
limits to use the property as it thought advantageous and convenient in
performing its contracts and maximizing its profits from them.”175
4.

Whether the contractor exceeds its authority under contract

Once a court has determined that the government provided sufficient
instruction to the contractor to justify a potential extension of immunity, the
court then turns to the fourth factor: whether the contractor exceeded its
authority in implementing the government’s instructions.
Most courts recognize that, to take advantage of a sovereign-shield
defense, government contractors must do more than simply “stay[] within the
thematic umbrella of the work that the government authorized.”176 When
considering whether a contractor has exceeded its authority, courts have
generally construed the scope of the contractor’s authority narrowly and
specifically.177 The Fourth Circuit has held, for example, that violating
military directives and breaching a contract with the government can take a
government contractor outside the protections of Yearsley immunity.178
Consider the Supreme Court’s analysis in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,179 a
2016 case analyzing facts similar to those in Cunningham and claims also under
the TCPA. In Campbell-Ewald, the United States Navy contracted with
175. 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958); see also Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 500 (1950)

176.

177.

178.
179.

(finding that although the government did reserve “large rights of supervision,
auditing and inspection,” the contracting entity was responsible for the hiring,
assignments, supervision, and pay of its employees), superseded by statute, Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 401, 80 Stat. 830, 841-42 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 207); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 13 (1941)
(“[H]owever extensively the Government may have reserved the right to restrict or
control the action of the contractors in other respects, neither the reservation nor the
exercise of that power gave to the contractors the status of agents of the Government
to enter into contracts or to pledge its credit.”).
In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 345 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that the lower
court erred in dismissing the plaintiff ’s case on derivative-sovereign-immunity
grounds and pointing to the need to assess evidence about the specific contract and
KBR’s actions in accordance with the contract); see also Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics
Info. Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640, 647 (4th Cir. 2018).
See, e.g., In re KBR, 744 F.3d at 344-45 (determining that Yearsley supported the plaintiffs’
narrower view that the contractor exceeded its authority with respect to specific terms
of the contract rather than the contractor’s broader view that it “acted within the scope
of its scope of authority by performing general waste management and water
treatment functions”); Norat v. Fluor Intercontinental, Inc., No. 14-cv-04902, 2018 WL
1382666, at *14 (D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2018).
In re KBR, 744 F.3d at 345.
136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
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Campbell-Ewald Company, a nationwide advertising agency, to develop and
execute a multimedia recruiting campaign that included mass text
messaging.180 There the contractor retained the responsibility to generate a list
of phone numbers under the contract, but it could only send messages to those
who had “opted in” to receiving Navy solicitations.181 When an individual
alleging that he did not opt in to receive the texts filed suit against CampbellEwald, asserting that the messages he received violated the TCPA, the Court
affirmed the lower court’s decision denying summary judgment for CampbellEwald.182 It held that if, as alleged, the contractor violated both federal law and
the government’s explicit instructions, that would jettison any immunity
shield derived from the government’s sovereignty.183 Campbell-Ewald and
Cunningham differ in the amount of discretion afforded the contractor and,
more importantly, in the contractors’ actions with respect to the government’s
instructions.184
Similarly, once the government provides reasonably precise specifications,
the contractor can only remain within the reach of Boyle if the contractor
actually followed those instructions. Under this construction of the Boyle
doctrine, there are only two choices. Either: (1) the federal government is the
active decisionmaker and the government contractor is an implementer, in
which case the actions are truly those of the government and should be
shielded from liability; or (2) the federal government chooses not to be in
charge, ceding decisionmaking responsibility to the private contractor, in
which case the actions are truly those of the private actor and should not be
shielded from liability for negligence or other torts. One district court
180. Id. at 667.
181. Id.; see also Cunningham, 888 F.3d at 648 (“Notably, this scenario is vastly distinguishable

from the facts of Campbell-Ewald.”).
182. Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. at 667-69, 674.
183. Id. at 672-74.
184. Malone, supra note 86, at 109-10 (“The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez not only lends support to the existence of derivative
immunity as a doctrine distinct from Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., but outlines when
derivative immunity may be extended pursuant to common law agency principles.”
(footnotes omitted)). Although there is evidence to show that the Supreme Court’s overall
trend is to be more protective of sovereign immunity, at least in some circumstances, see
Florey, supra note 69, at 820, we disagree with Malone’s conclusion that Campbell-Ewald
indicated that “derivative immunity should not be narrowly construed.” Malone, supra
note 86, at 111. Rather, we view Campbell-Ewald as consistent with courts’ previous
decisions on derivative-sovereign-immunity shields and suggest that the Court’s opinion
makes clear that the doctrines should be applied only in limited factual circumstances. See
W. Logan Lewis, Note, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez: Diminishing the Derivative
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and the Social Costs of Increasing Liability to Government
Contractors, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1491, 1506 (2018) (arguing that Campbell-Ewald
contracted, rather than expanded, the scope of derivative sovereign immunity).
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explained that the “government contractor defense” is available where “the
government hires a contractor to perform a given task, and specifies the
manner in which the task is to be performed, and the contractor is later haled
into court to answer for a harm that was caused by the contractor’s compliance
with the government’s specifications . . . .”185 The court compared that scenario
to another in which “the contractor is hired to perform the same task, but is
allowed to exercise discretion in determining how the task should be
accomplished,” explaining that the contractor would not be entitled to
derivative sovereign immunity “if the manner of performing the task
ultimately causes actionable harm to a third party . . . because the harm can be
traced, not to the government’s actions or decisions, but to the contractor’s
independent decision to perform the task in an unsafe manner.”186
In addition to drawing a line between the government’s decisionmaking
and the contractor’s decisionmaking, courts look to the source of the alleged
injury to determine whether the blame should lie with the government or
with the contractor. In Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, for example, a class of
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ dredging activities damaged protective
wetlands in the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, which in turn resulted in
extensive damage to the New Orleans region during Hurricane Katrina.187 The
Fifth Circuit found that the defendant contractors were entitled to immunity
under the Yearsley doctrine because the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to allege
that the contractor defendants “exceeded their authority or in any way
deviated from Congress’s direction or expectations.”188 Importantly, the
Ackerson court determined that the plaintiffs’ allegations attacked the dredging
project as a whole; the plaintiffs did not point to any specific or separate act of
negligence by the defendant contractors in executing the contract.189 In the
Boyle context, the court in Adams v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc. used the same
analysis to come to the opposite conclusion: Where the contractor was unable
to establish that the alleged injury was “the necessary and unavoidable
consequence” of manufacturing munitions for the Army or that “the work
cannot be done without inflicting the injury,” the nongovernmental actor was
not entitled to the benefit of Boyle immunity, presumably because conduct that
was not contractually required caused the harm.190

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Bixby v. KBR, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1242 (D. Or. 2010).
Id.
589 F.3d 196, 202-03 (5th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 207.
Id.
201 F. Supp. 2d 700, 708 (W.D. Va. 2002) (quoting Schrader v. Hercules, Inc., 489 F. Supp.
159, 161 (W.D. Va. 1980)).
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Both the third factor and the fourth rest on an agency-like analysis of the
relationship between the federal government and its contractor. In the typical
case outside the context of federal outsourcing, the court looks at agency
relationships in order to determine whether liability of the agent continues
upward to reach that agent’s principal.191 In sovereign-shield cases, however,
the court is performing an inverted agency analysis: The court looks at the
relationship to determine whether attributes of the principal extend downward
to protect the agent that caused the harm. We explore the risks and
possibilities of this inverted agency analysis more in a companion article.192
For present purposes, the critical observation is that when a court asks
whether the sovereign is really responsible, the answer determines whether
the agent is protected alongside its principal, rather than determining whether
the principal is liable alongside its agent.
5.

Effect on federal policymaking and decisionmaking

The fifth factor is the opaque question of whether a state law or regulation
impermissibly affects federal policymaking or decisionmaking.
A review of cases suggests the following guidance: Where the state seeks to
regulate the United States and its installations directly, the Constitution
prohibits such regulation absent congressional consent.193 But where the state
seeks to regulate private actors in their contracts with the United States, the
Constitution permits such regulation absent congressional action to extend
immunity.194 Congress can “endow” government corporations and contractors
191. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS

ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND
CORPORATIONS 36 (10th ed. 2018) (explaining the significance of the relationship
between a tortfeasor and the entity that is the tortfeasor’s alleged principal in the
context of torts occurring at gas stations).
192. See Elengold & Glater, supra note 6 (manuscript at 46).
193. See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 198-99 (1976) (holding that state permitting
requirements were improper as applied to federal installations absent congressional
authorization), superseded by statute, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 9595, § 116, 91 Stat. 685, 711 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7418); Goodyear Atomic
Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 180 (1988) (“It is well settled that the activities of federal
installations are shielded by the Supremacy Clause from direct state regulation unless
Congress provides ‘clear and unambiguous’ authorization for such regulation.” (quoting
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 211 (1976))); Boeing
Co. v. Movassaghi, 768 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2014) (addressing “a state’s authority, as
opposed to the federal government’s authority,” to “mandate more stringent cleanup
procedures, not generally applicable within the state, to a particular site where the
federal government undertook to clean up nuclear contamination it created”).
194. Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm’n, 318 U.S. 261, 271 (1943) (“And we have held
that [state regulatory] burdens, save as Congress may act to remove them, are to be
regarded as the normal incidents of the operation within the same territory of a dual
footnote continued on next page
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with immunity, but it must do so explicitly.195 Courts, lacking clear
congressional instructions, have relied at least in part on that lack of
instructions to reject attempts to extend immunity to congressionally created
corporations,196 building contractors,197 government lessees,198 and operations
contractors199—even when the burden on the contractor becomes an economic
burden on the United States.200

195.

196.
197.

198.
199.

200.

system of government, and that no immunity of the national government from such
burdens is to be implied from the Constitution which established the system . . . .”); see
also United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 51 (1964) (“If [cost implications for the federal
government] unduly intrude upon the business of the Nation, it is for Congress, in the
valid exercise of its proper powers, not this Court, to make the desirable adjustment.”).
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388-89 (1939) (concluding that
absent a congressional intent to endow a governmental corporation with governmental
immunity, “the government does not become the conduit of its immunity in suits against
its agents or instrumentalities merely because they do its work”).
Id. at 395-96.
Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 8 (1941) (“Congress has declined to pass
legislation immunizing from state taxation contractors under ‘cost-plus’ contracts for
the construction of governmental projects.”).
United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958); United States v. City
of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 474-75 (1958).
Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 512 (1950) (pointing to the fact that Congress
could have, but chose not to, expressly exempt “employees engaged in producing
munitions for use by the United States in war” from the Fair Labor Standards Act),
superseded by statute, Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601,
§ 401, 80 Stat. 830, 841-42 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 207).
Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm’n, 318 U.S. 261, 269 (1943); see also Curry v.
United States, 314 U.S. 14, 18 (1941) (recognizing that a state tax will burden the
government “only as the economic burden is shifted to it through operation of the
contract,” which is insufficient to confer immunity on a contractor); United States v.
Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 44 (1964) (“The Constitution immunizes the United States and its
property from taxation by the States, but it does not forbid a tax whose legal incidence
is upon a contractor doing business with the United States, even though the economic
burden of the tax, by contract or otherwise, is ultimately borne by the United States.”
(citation omitted) (citing James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Graves v.
New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); and King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1)). But see
Boeing Co. v. Movassaghi, 768 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding the tax cases
“inapposite as they discuss generally applicable state tax laws, which resulted in merely
an increased economic burden on federal contractors . . . [and] did not regulate what the
federal contractors had to do or how they did it pursuant to their contracts”). It is
important to note that Congress’s power to legislate around the first principles of
government immunity is limited to Congress. It does not extend to federal agencies. See
Penn Dairies, 318 U.S. at 276-78 (finding an Army regulation that specifically addressed
state price-fixing law did not “immunize government contractors from local pricefixing regulations which would otherwise be applicable”). Nor does it extend to the
language of the government contract. See id. at 277 (citing favorably the opinion of the
Comptroller General that “since the constitutional applicability of local price
regulations to government contractors was doubtful, the right of the government to
challenge their validity should not be foreclosed by contractual provisions”). And it
footnote continued on next page
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Courts further consider “whether the state law effectively controls the
[federal] enterprise.”201 This is an ill-defined inquiry, but its importance is
clear: States cannot effectively grant themselves veto power over federal
decisions. It is helpful, therefore, to look at some examples to understand the
lines drawn by the courts. The Supreme Court has held that states could not
tax the capital of the Bank of the United States, but were permitted to tax the
shares, for example, even when the tax was collected from the bank itself.202
The former represented a tax on the capital of a federal installation; the latter
represented a tax on the profits made by individuals interacting with the
federal installation. In another context, the Court held that a Florida law
regulating the sale and distribution of commercial fertilizer was
unconstitutional as applied directly to the United States’ distribution of
commercial fertilizer in Florida as part of a national soil-conservation
program.203 On the other hand, the Court held that a North Dakota law
regulating sale and transportation of alcohol in the state was constitutional as
applied to liquor suppliers selling to federal military installations.204 The Court
explained:
Whatever burdens are imposed on the Federal Government by a neutral state law
regulating its suppliers “are but normal incidents of the organization within the
same territory of two governments.” A state regulation is invalid only if it
regulates the United States directly or discriminates against the Federal

201.
202.

203.

204.

remains unaffected by the United States government’s position on the matter in
litigation. See, e.g., King & Boozer, 314 U.S. at 13-14 (rejecting the intervenor
government’s position that its contractor was entitled to derivative immunity). In fact,
in the great majority of intergovernmental-immunity cases cited herein, the United
States or its agencies have intervened, sought to intervene, or spoken on behalf of the
contractor seeking an extension of immunity. See, e.g., id. at 7; Penn Dairies, 318 U.S. at
268; Muskegon, 355 U.S. at 485; United States v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 371 U.S. 285, 286
(1963). Involvement on one side of the case was not decisive. In fact, it was not relevant.
Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 964 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (citing
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819)).
Compare McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436-37 (holding that the states may not impose
a tax on the operations of the Bank of the United States but may still tax the “real
property of the bank, in common with the other real property within the State,
[and] . . . the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in
common with other property of the same description throughout the State”), and
Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 867 (1824) (holding that the states
may impose a tax on the “property of the contractor . . . as the property of other
citizens,” but that the states may not impose a tax on “the act of purchasing, or of
conveying the articles purchased”), with Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353,
359-63 (1870) (holding that a state could tax the shares of the National Bank, even when
the tax was collected from the bank itself).
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 442-43, 447 (1943) (distinguishing the case from
previous cases because the required “inspection fees [were] laid directly upon the United
States” (emphasis added)).
North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 426, 443-44 (1990) (plurality opinion).
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Government or those with whom it deals. In addition, the question whether a
state regulation discriminates against the Federal Government cannot be viewed
in isolation. Rather, the entire regulatory system should be analyzed to determine
whether it is discriminatory “with regard to the economic burdens that result.”
Claims to any further degree of immunity must be resolved under principles of
congressional pre-emption.205

Where it appears that the state can override a federal decision about how to
implement a federal policy or program, courts have generally barred the
application of state statutes to the federal government. For example, in Leslie
Miller, the Court held that “[s]ubjecting a federal contractor to the Arkansas
contractor license requirements would give the State’s licensing board a virtual
power of review over the federal determination of ‘responsibility’ and would
thus frustrate the expressed federal policy of selecting the lowest responsible
bidder.”206 These cases are distinct from those involving states’ efforts to
impose “safety or other requirements on a contractor who does business” with
the federal government; in those cases, courts have upheld state regulation.207
II. The Case of Student-Loan Servicers
Part I set out the doctrines and analyses that constitute the sovereign shield
as applied to nongovernmental actors. Understanding the doctrine is more
than an academic exercise: It is necessary to see how government contractors
are turning to preemption and immunity defenses—clouding, conflating, and
exploiting them—to extend the sovereign shield. Our case study in this Part
involves private companies servicing almost $1.6 trillion of governmentowned student debt.208 Federal contractors have become the primary point of
205. Id. at 435 (citations omitted) (first quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 422

(1938); and then quoting Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 544 (1983)).
206. Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 190 (1956) (per curiam); see also Pub. Utils.

Comm’n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 544-45 (1958) (finding a conflict “between the
federal policy of negotiated rates and the state policy of regulation of negotiated rates”
such that the state regulation would affect the United States’ ability to negotiate rates
for its military shipments); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55, 57 (1920) (holding that
a postal-service employee was immune from prosecution under a state law regulating
driver’s licenses because the state law impinged on the federal government’s “duty . . . to
employ persons competent for their work”).
207. See, e.g., Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 355 U.S. at 543 (citing Balt. & A. R. Co. v. Lichtenberg, 4 A.2d
734 (Md. 1939)); James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1940); Penn
Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm’n, 318 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1943).
208. Federal Student Loan Portfolio, FED. STUDENT AID, https://perma.cc/BH4W-FSU9
(archived Feb. 9, 2021) (to locate, click “Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary” to
download the Excel spreadsheet) (indicating that the total amount of outstanding
federal student loans is nearly $1.6 trillion). This is big business. As of April 2020, the
United States Department of Education reported a combined current contract amount
of around $4.1 billion, at least $2.4 billion of which arose out of the Office of Federal
footnote continued on next page
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contact for borrowers: Servicers handle billing, collection, repayment plans,
loan consolidation, and other tasks.209
Student borrowers and state attorneys general have accused these private
companies of violating state and federal law in performing their servicing
contracts.210 They have claimed, for example, that servicers do not provide
accurate or adequate information to borrowers,211 that they steer borrowers
into costly forbearance options instead of more favorable repayment plans,212
that they misapply payments,213 that they charge amounts not owed,214 and
that they have failed to correctly administer congressionally created debtforgiveness programs like the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program215 and

209.

210.

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Student Aid. See Off. of the Chief Fin. Officer, Contracts Information, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.,
https://perma.cc/V3HB-9AQV (archived Feb. 9, 2021) (to locate, click “Active
Contracts” to download the Excel spreadsheet). Many of these contracts are multi-year
contracts, spanning from one to ten years. Id.
See Loan Servicing Contracts, FED. STUDENT AID, https://perma.cc/D4EJ-7NWY
(archived Feb. 10, 2021). As of the most recent filings, the Department of Education
contracts with Conduent Education Services (formerly ACS Education Services),
PHEAA (which does business with the federal government under the name FedLoan
Servicing), Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Nelnet Servicing, Navient (Sallie
Mae), Aspire, COSTEP, EdFinancial/ESA, EDGEucation/CF, EdManage,
Kentucky/KSA, MOHELA, NHHELC, OSLA, and VSAC to service its student-loan
portfolio. Id. Conduent Education Services, however, is “in the process of winding
down its business.” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Settles with Conduent Education
Services, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (May 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/MLW9-J4MR.
These are similar services to other “privatized” industries. See Metzger, supra note 6, at
1380-94 (recognizing the vast influence of private contractors over programs and
participants in Medicare and Medicaid, welfare, public education, and federal prisons).
Between January 1, 2018, and November 6, 2020, more than 13,000 complaints have
been filed with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) alleging problems
with student-loan servicing. See Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, https://perma.cc/G7R9-8ZZF (archived Feb. 9, 2021). Separately, the
attorneys general of California, New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have all
filed lawsuits against student-loan servicers over their managing of borrowers. See
People v. Navient Complaint, supra note 22; Complaint, New York ex rel. James v. Pa.
Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 19-cv-09155, 2020 WL 2097640 (S.D.N.Y. May 1,
2020), 2019 WL 5095707, ECF No. 1 [hereinafter James Complaint]; Commonwealth v.
Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018 WL 1137520 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2018); Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2020).
See People v. Navient Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 123-125.
Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2020).
Id. at 282.
Commonwealth v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018
WL 1137520, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2018).
New York ex rel. James v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 19-cv-09155, 2020
WL 2097640, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2020); Reavis v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency, 467 P.3d 588, 590-91 (Mont. 2020).
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total and permanent disability discharge.216 The New York Attorney General,
for example, alleged that the mistakes and incompetence of the Pennsylvania
Higher Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA) have driven the low number (a
dismal 1%) of applicants who have been approved for relief pursuant to Public
Service Loan Forgiveness and that the company has misrepresented
information concerning benefits available to borrowers who have cancer,
failing to afford them legally mandated relief during treatment.217 These
alleged acts stem in part from the incentives that servicers have to maximize
profits, which, in the absence of contractual requirements to the contrary, give
them no reason to care about borrowers’ best interests.218 All told, at least
seven state attorneys general219 and countless private plaintiffs have sued
servicers for violations of state law, while the federal Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB),220 at least four state attorneys general,221 and

216. See People v. Navient Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 93-99 (alleging that student-loan

217.
218.

219.

220.

221.

servicer Navient improperly and incorrectly reported loans that had been discharged
under the Total and Permanent Disability Discharge program, harming the
borrowers); id. ¶¶ 114-17 (alleging that the student-loan servicer made false statements
to borrowers about the conditions and requirements of the Total and Permanent
Disability Discharge program). See generally Clare Lombardo & Cory Turner, Student
Loan Borrowers with Disabilities Aren’t Getting Help They Were Promised, NPR (Dec. 4,
2019, 5:00 AM ET), https://perma.cc/2GTR-LZHM (citing systemic problems with the
implementation of the total and permanent disability discharge program).
See James Complaint, supra note 210, ¶¶ 6-21, 75, 316-20.
In fact, in court filings, at least one servicer has asserted that its “relationship with
borrowers is that of an arm’s-length loan servicer, not a fiduciary counselor . . . and
there is no expectation that the servicer will ‘act in the interest[s] of the consumer.’ ”
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff ’s
Complaint Under Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement
Under Rule 12(e) at 20-21, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 17-cv00101, 2017 WL 3380530 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017), 2017 WL 10543348, ECF No. 29
(quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(2)(C)).
See supra note 210 (citing to complaints by the attorneys general of California, New
York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania); Complaint, State v. Navient Corp., No. 17-201115-1, 2017 Wash. Super. LEXIS 14368 (Wash. Super. Ct. July 17, 2017); Complaint,
People v. Navient Corp., No. 2017-CH-00761 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 18, 2017), 2017 WL
374522; Complaint, Grewal v. Navient Corp., No. EXS-C-172-2020 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Oct. 20, 2020), 2020 WL 7873544.
See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other Relief, Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 17-cv-00101, 2017 WL 3380530 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017),
2017 WL 191446, ECF No. 1 (alleging that the student-loan servicer’s practices violated
several federal laws, including the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16921692p).
See supra note 210; see also James Complaint, supra note 210 (alleging that a student-loan
servicer violated both state and federal laws).
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several private consumers have sued servicers for violations of federal law.222
At least eleven states and the District of Columbia have introduced legislation
that seeks to regulate or implement oversight of student-loan servicers
operating in their states.223 And at least one congressional oversight committee
has sought testimony when investigating servicer conduct.224
In response, student-loan servicers have sought to evade liability and
oversight. Servicers use the principles underlying the sovereign shield to try to
avoid liability under both state225 and federal226 law, and to resist legislative
oversight at both the state227 and federal228 levels. Servicers argue that their
relationship with the federal Department of Education constitutes a defense to
their actions.229 They have even gone so far as to argue that their “federal-ness”
222. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Navient Sols., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 3d 889, 894 (W.D. Wisc. 2020)

223.

224.

225.

226.

227.

228.

229.

(upholding a jury verdict in a suit by a student-loan borrower who alleged violations of
the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act by a student-loan servicer).
See, e.g., Assemb. 2251, 2016 Leg. (Cal. 2016); H.R. 6915, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess.
(Conn. 2015); S. 19-002, 72d Gen. Assemb. (Colo. 2019); D.C. Council 21-571 (2016);
S. 1351, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017); S. 995, 129th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019);
Assemb. 455, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018); S. 1958, 242d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); H.R. 5936,
2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2019); S. 6029, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018); S. 77,
2020 Leg. (Va. 2020); H.D. 594, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019).
An Examination of State Efforts to Oversee the $1.5 Trillion Student Loan Servicing Market:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
116th Cong. 1-2 (2019); see also Memorandum from the House Fin. Servs. Majority Staff
to House Comm. on Fin. Servs. Members (June 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/XV4FT9BV (describing concerns about servicer conduct that prompted congressional
hearings).
See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or,
Alternatively, for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), Chae v. SLM Corp., No. 07-cv-02319, 2008 WL 11342464 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26,
2007), ECF No. 42.
See, e.g., James, 2020 WL 2097640, at *18 (describing the servicer’s argument that the
New York Attorney General could not enforce a federal law providing for payment of
damages by the defendant).
For example, servicers filed a lawsuit challenging the licensing regime established by
the legislature of the District of Columbia based on, among other arguments, federal
preemption and intergovernmental immunity. See Student Loan Servicing All. v.
District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2018). Servicers also opposed
state legislative efforts. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 129 Before the J. Comm. on Consumer Prot. &
Prod. Licensure, 119th Gen. Court (Mass. 2017) (statement of Winfield Crigler,
Executive Director, Student Loan Servicing Alliance), https://perma.cc/QD5D-RS8Y
(opposing state legislation governing servicers); see also infra notes 233-37.
See, e.g., Michael Stratford, Company Managing Public Service Loan Forgiveness Refuses to
Testify Before House Panel, POLITICO (Sept. 17, 2019, 3:49 PM EDT),
https://perma.cc/9URA-5CKB.
Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d 112, 122 (D. Conn. 2020)
(describing the servicer’s argument that the presumption against preemption did not
apply “where . . . a state purports to regulate federal contracts and contractors” (quoting
footnote continued on next page
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under the Higher Education Act should block state law claims against them.230
Their arguments thus seamlessly and confusingly interweave preemption,
derivative-sovereign-immunity, and intergovernmental-immunity doctrines,
fashioning from the muddle an argument for application of a far-reaching
sovereign shield. And they have fashioned this argument with the explicit
support of their contracting partner, the Department of Education.231 In
several circumstances, servicers have successfully avoided judicial and
regulatory scrutiny, closing off avenues of redress for potentially meritorious
claims and preventing legislative review of servicer conduct.232
For example, when the trade group Student Loan Servicing Alliance
(SLSA) sued the District of Columbia to stop the District from implementing
legislation to oversee and license student-loan servicers operating in its
jurisdiction, SLSA sought relief by mounting a preemption challenge to the
local legislation.233 Only later, once the United States filed a statement of
interest raising an intergovernmental-immunity defense, did SLSA assert that
such a defense was also included in its complaint.234 As support, SLSA pointed
to the portion of its complaint that asked for relief under the Supremacy
Clause, arguing that it covered both preemption and intergovernmental
immunity.235 Even though the court claimed that it was not persuaded by this
argument, it nevertheless decided “in its discretion” to consider the
intergovernmental-immunity challenge.236 Although the case was ultimately

230.
231.

232.

233.
234.
235.
236.

Plaintiff ’s Opposition to State Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Perez,
457 F. Supp. 3d 112 (No. 18-cv-01114), ECF No. 68)).
See Brief of Appellee at 11, 15, 30, Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 955
F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-14490), 2019 WL 268379.
The Department of Education, for example, produced a memorandum arguing that
states’ efforts to regulate servicers’ conduct were preempted by federal law. See Federal
Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal Student
Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,620
(Mar. 12, 2018).
See, e.g., Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 944-50 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that claims
alleging misrepresentation under California state law were preempted by the Higher
Education Act); Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 75-76 (enjoining the
District of Columbia from enforcing consumer-protection laws against student-loan
servicers as related to the Federal Direct Loan Program and government-owned
Federal Family Education Loan Program loans); see also infra notes 318-20 and
accompanying text (describing PHEAA’s ability to skirt congressional oversight by
pointing to its contractual relationship with the Department of Education).
Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 36.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 73.
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withdrawn,237 the district court’s opinion essentially invalidated the District’s
attempts to regulate the servicers.238
This Part offers a brief introduction to the student-loan legislative and
regulatory scheme. It then analyzes the varied attempts by the private loanservicer companies contracting with the Department of Education to evade
liability and oversight by claiming that their relationship with the federal
government entitles them to the protections of the sovereign shield.
A. A Brief Introduction to Student-Loan Servicing
In 1965, with the passage of the Higher Education Act, Congress
incentivized higher education by creating a financial structure—consisting of
loans, grants, and work-study—to allow more people to finance their
studies.239 At first, commercial lenders like banks originated, held, and serviced
student loans, which received government guarantees.240 In 1972, Congress
created a new enterprise, the Student Loan Marketing Association, better
known as Sallie Mae, to supplement banks.241 Congress set the terms of federal
student loans, which the federal government subsidized and ultimately
guaranteed,242 and also set the rate of return received by the lenders that made
them.243 These guaranteed loans, whether made by Sallie Mae or a bank or

237. See Student Loan Servicing All. v. Taylor, No. 19-7001, 2019 WL 2158372 (D.C. Cir.
238.
239.

240.
241.

242.
243.

May 15, 2019).
Dena Aubin, Court Invalidates Part of D.C. Student Loan Servicer Law, REUTERS (Nov. 26,
2018, 2:53 PM), https://perma.cc/3ZNS-4DGW.
Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, §§ 401, 421, 441, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232,
1236, 1249-50 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070a, 1071, 1087-51) (creating a
federal infrastructure for student lending).
See id. § 421, 79 Stat. at 1232.
SLM Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), item 1, at 2 (Feb. 26, 2015). Sallie Mae
subsequently converted into a private corporation, which then split into two publicly
traded entities, one servicing loans and one originating them. Id.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1077a, 1078.
In the Higher Education Act of 1965, Congress delegated to the secretary of the thenDepartment of Health, Education, and Welfare the authority to set interest rates on
education loans, subject to limits included in the statute. Higher Education Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 427(a)(2)(D), (b), 79 Stat. 1219, 1238-40 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1077(a)(2)(D), (b)). In subsequent legislation, Congress set interest rates directly.
See, e.g., Act of Feb. 8, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-139, §1(a)(1), 116 Stat. 8, 8 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1077a) (fixing interest rates for specific categories of federal
student loans). More recently, Congress effectively set student-loan interest rates to
zero in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 3513, 134 Stat. 281, 404 (2020) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1001 note (COVID-19 Pandemic Education Relief)) (temporarily suspending accrual
of interest on federal student loans).

1015

The Sovereign Shield
73 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2021)

other commercial lender, were called Federal Family Education Loan Program
(FFELP) loans.244
This structure endured until the 2008 financial crisis, which interrupted
some commercial lenders’ access to capital to extend new student loans.245 In
2008, Congress passed the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act
(ECASLA), which authorized the Department of Education to acquire loans
from commercial lenders so that they could use the proceeds to make new
loans to student borrowers.246 In 2010, Congress enacted the Student Aid and
Fiscal Responsibility Act (SAFRA), a rider to the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act.247 SAFRA ended the guaranteed-loan program,248 and
student borrowers consequently had to turn to what (until then) had been a
much smaller direct lending program: the William D. Ford Federal Direct
Loan Program.249 Through direct lending, the Department of Education itself
originates and owns all new federal loans.250 Although the government no
longer offers FFELP loans, more than 11 million Americans still owe $246
billion combined of guaranteed-loan debt.251 And more than 35 million
Americans owe roughly $1.3 trillion combined in direct-loan debt.252
Despite ending the guaranteed-loan program, the 2010 statutory change
did not excise private companies from the student-lending scheme. Rather,
Congress specifically authorized the Department of Education to contract with
private companies to keep track of borrowers’ obligations and to handle

244. 34 C.F.R. § 682.100(a) (2019).
245. GEORGE MILLER, ENSURING CONTINUED ACCESS TO STUDENT LOANS ACT OF 2008, H.R.

246.
247.
248.
249.

250.
251.
252.

REP. NO. 110-583, at 3 (2008) (explaining how “turmoil in the U.S. credit markets has
made it difficult for some lenders in the federally guaranteed student-loan program to
secure the capital needed to finance college loans, leading some lenders to scale back
their lending activity”).
Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-227, § 7(b),
122 Stat. 740, 746-47 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087i-1).
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §§ 22012213, 124 Stat. 1029, 1071-81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
See id. §§ 2201-2208.
Although SAFRA ended funding for the guaranteed-loan program, it did not touch the
direct-loan program, through which the Department of Education extended loans
directly to students. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.10 (“Under the William D. Ford Federal Direct
Loan (Direct Loan) Program (formerly known as the Federal Direct Student Loan
Program), the Secretary makes loans to enable a student or parent to pay the costs of
the student’s attendance at a postsecondary school.”).
See id.
Federal Student Loan Portfolio, supra note 208 (summarizing data collected in the
National Student Loan Data System as of Q4 2020).
Id.
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billing, collection, repayment plans, loan consolidation, and other tasks.253
Since the passage of ECASLA and SAFRA, the Department of Education has
relied on contractors to manage an increasing volume of student-loan
originations and servicing.254 The Department, touting the promise and
benefit of private-sector efficiency, energy, and expertise,255 turned to private
companies to “deliver the best-in-business service” to their customers.256 To
manage the increased lending under the Direct Loan Program, the Department
of Education hired private companies using indefinite-delivery, indefinitequantity, performance-based contracts.257 As a result, the nearly 36 million
253. The Higher Education Act delegates to the Secretary of Education the authority to

254.

255.

256.
257.

contract directly with private companies to service the Department of Education’s
student loans. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087f.
See Federal Student Aid: Performance-Based Organization Review: Joint Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations of the Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform & the Subcomm. on
Higher Educ. on Workforce Training of the Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 114th Cong.
11 (2015) (statement of James W. Runcie, Chief Operating Officer, Office of Federal
Student Aid, Department of Education) (discussing increasing volume of loan
originations and servicing); ERNST & YOUNG LLP, TIVAS SERVICING CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT 3, 5-7, 17 (2011), https://perma.cc/G3R2-F2JX (noting that the
Department of Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid and a preexisting servicer
were responsible for servicing loans once the FFEL program was shut down, and
warning of the challenge of managing increasing numbers of borrowers); see also Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Secretary DeVos Announces Intent to Enhance FSA’s Next
Generation Processing and Servicing Environment: Creating the Foundation of
Tomorrow’s Student Loan Program (Aug. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/X7R5-LANF
(quoting Dr. A. Wayne Johnson, the Department of Education’s Chief Operating
Officer of Federal Student Aid, as saying that the federal student-loan program is “the
equivalent of being the largest special purpose consumer bank in the world”). Federal
law permits the Department of Education to enter into contracts for “the servicing and
collection of [direct loans].” 20 U.S.C. § 1087f(b)(2).
See Steven J. Kelman, Achieving Contracting Goals and Recognizing Public Law Concerns: A
Contracting Management Perspective, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 153,
154-55 (arguing that contracting “has substantive goals and aims” and pointing to
modern transaction-cost economics, which recognizes that contracting “brings the
well-known advantages of the marketplace,” as a rationale for utilizing government
contractors); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education
Expands Its Student Loan Servicing Capacity: Stabilizing Student Loan Market,
Protecting Borrowers and Safeguarding (June 17, 2009), https://perma.cc/SQC5-X26B
(asserting that the hiring of outside servicers would ensure that “students have access to
federal student loans and that, in partnership with the private sector, schools and
borrowers receive excellent service” (quoting then-Secretary of Education Arne
Duncan)).
Federal Student Aid Contracts, FED. STUDENT AID, https://perma.cc/2MDH-LH4F
(archived Feb 9, 2021).
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A02L0006, FEDERAL STUDENT
AID’S AWARD AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE TITLE IV ADDITIONAL SERVICERS
CONTRACTS: FINAL AUDIT REPORT 3 & n.1 (2013), https://perma.cc/RK7T-RR2F. The
turn to private contractors was due to the “sudden increase in current and potential
loan volume that the Department will be responsible for servicing” due to legislation
footnote continued on next page
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recipients of federal student loans258 interact primarily with private
companies that service their loans and collect on their debts.259 As of this
writing, four companies—PHEAA, Great Lakes, Navient, and Nelnet—service
83% of the government’s education-debt portfolio.260
B. Servicers and the Sovereign Shield
Student-loan servicers face allegations of unfair and deceptive practices,
fraud, and other consumer-protection violations, and they are battling lawsuits

governing student loans. See U.S. Dep’t. of Educ. & Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs.,
Contract for Commercial Items 19 (2009), https://perma.cc/WCY7-T2VG. Indefinitedelivery, indefinite-quantity contracts “provide for an indefinite quantity of services
for a fixed time” and are “used when [the government] can’t determine . . . the precise
quantities of supplies or services that the government will require during the contract
period.” Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity Contracts, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/8JD3-TF6Y (last updated Nov. 9, 2020). These contracts are “playing
an increasingly dominant role in federal procurement.” Steven L. Schooner, IndefiniteDelivery/Indefinite-Quantity Contracts: Time to Correlate Practice and Policy?, 32 NASH &
CIBINIC REP. ¶ 44 (2018).
258. See Portfolio Summary, FED. STUDENT AID, https://perma.cc/L7CT-PTMH (archived
Apr. 11, 2021).
259. See Loan Servicing Contracts, supra note 209. There are four primary servicers (Great
Lakes Educational Loan Services, Nelnet Servicing, PHEAA, and Navient) and, as of
this writing, ten smaller, nonprofit servicers (Aspire, COSTEP, Edfinancial/ESA,
EDGEucation/CF, EdManage, Kentucky/KSA, MOHELA, NHHELC, OSLA, and
VSAC). See id. In addition, the Department of Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid
has signed contracts with five companies—Edfinancial Services LLC, F.H. Cann &
Associates LLC, MAXIMUS Federal Services Inc., MOHELA, and Texas Guaranteed
Student Loan Corporation (Trellis Company)—to “support customers through direct
engagement via contact centers and provide back-office processing support for
students, parents, borrowers and partners at more than 5,800 postsecondary
institutions.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education’s Office
of Federal Student Aid Announces New Contracts with Five Companies to Improve
Customer Service, Increase Accountability (June 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/RNY9ZAUQ. It is not clear whether these functions constitute “servicing.”
260. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A05Q0008, FEDERAL STUDENT AID:
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF SERVICER NONCOMPLIANCE WITH
REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICING FEDERALLY HELD STUDENT LOANS 6 (2019),
https://perma.cc/2E68-YKSY. These contracts are lucrative. Just in federal servicing, for
example, PHEAA currently holds more than $57 million in contracts. Off. of the Chief
Fin. Officer, supra note 208. Navient holds more than $39 million in contracts with the
Department of Education. Id. Nelnet, which operates Nelnet Servicing, LLC, acquired
Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc. in February 2018. Press Release, Nelnet,
Nelnet Completes Acquisition of Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc. (Feb. 7,
2018), https://perma.cc/A5K6-MKMK. As of December 31, 2019, Nelnet Servicing
(having absorbed Great Lakes) serviced $423.8 billion of student loans for more than 13
million student borrowers under its federal contracts. Nelnet, Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), item 1, at 4-5 (Feb. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/32H7-C7UC.
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filed by state attorneys general and private plaintiffs.261 This is an issue
working its way through the courts right now. We have identified sixteen
court cases involving student-loan servicers currently pending or recently
closed in state or federal court.262 Servicers have attempted to deploy the
sovereign shield in all but one of these cases.263
261. See supra notes 210-22 and accompanying text; see also Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Court

Rules Student Loan Companies Are Subject to State Consumer Laws, Contrary to Trump
Administration’s Stance, WASH. POST (June 28, 2019, 12:25 PM PDT), https://perma.cc/
QA3D-K2V4.
262. Complaint, Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26
(D.D.C. 2018) (No. 18-cv-00640), ECF No. 1; Complaint, Pele v. Pa. Higher Educ.
Assistance Agency, 53 F. Supp. 3d 857 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 13-cv-01531), ECF No. 1;
Class Action Complaint, Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., No. 17-cv00253, 2018 WL 5621872 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2018), ECF No. 1; Class Action Complaint,
Hyland v. Navient Corp., No. 18-cv-09031, 2019 WL 2918238 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2019),
2018 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 15609, ECF No. 1; Class Action Complaint, Chery v.
Conduent Educ. Servs. LLC, No. 18-cv-00075, 2019 WL 1427140 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2019), 2018 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 7580, ECF No. 1; Complaint for Violations of
False Claims Act 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq., United States ex rel. Oberg v. Nelnet, Inc.,
No. 07-cv-00960, 2009 WL 10676201 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2009), ECF No. 1; Complaint for
Permanent Injunction & Other Relief, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp.,
supra note 220; Class Action Amended Complaint, Chae v. SLM Corp., No. 07-cv-02319,
2007 WL 9706711 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2007), ECF No. 3; People v. Navient Complaint,
supra note 22; Class Action Complaint, Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc.,
No. 17-cv-00183, 2017 WL 6501919 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2017), ECF No. 1; Complaint, supra
note 219; Complaint, supra note 210; Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other
Relief, Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 354 F. Supp. 3d 529 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (No. 17-cv01814), ECF No. 1; Class Action Complaint, Travis v. Navient Corp., 460 F. Supp. 3d 269
(E.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 17-cv-04885), 2017 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 35518, ECF No. 1;
Class Action Complaint, Daniel v. Navient Sols., LLC, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1319 (M.D. Fla.
2018) (No. 17-cv-02503), ECF No. 1; Verified Complaint, Genna v. Sallie Mae, Inc.,
No. 11-cv-07371, 2012 WL 1339482 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2012), ECF No. 1.
263. Plaintiff ’s Reply in Support of Its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Student
Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d 26 (No. 18-cv-00640), ECF No. 33 (asserting a
preemption defense); Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 46 (discussing SLSA’s
challenges to “the D.C. law . . . all based on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,”
including intergovernmental immunity); Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance
Agency’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint Based on
Eleventh Amendment at 1-5, Pele, 53 F. Supp. 3d 857 (No. 13-cv-01531), ECF No. 5
(asserting derivative state sovereign immunity); Defendant Great Lakes Higher
Education Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss & Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 510, Lawson-Ross, 2018 WL 5621872 (No. 17-cv-00253), ECF No. 26 (asserting a
preemption defense); Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint at 1-2, 7-12, Hyland, 2019 WL 2918238
(No. 18-cv-09031), ECF No. 23 (asserting a preemption defense); Defendants’
Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff ’s Amended
Complaint at 2, 12-15, Chery, 2019 WL 1427140 (No. 18-cv-00075), ECF No. 20-1
(asserting a preemption defense); Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to
Dismiss of Defendant Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency at 4-13, Oberg,
2009 WL 10676201 (No. 07-cv-00960), 2009 WL 5081033, ECF No. 98 (asserting a statesovereign-immunity defense); Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for
footnote continued on next page
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The servicers have attempted to conflate and exploit preemption,
derivative-sovereign-immunity, and intergovernmental-immunity defenses to
expand the sovereign shield to cover their conduct.264 Fighting to avoid
potential liability under state and federal law, to undermine state regulation,
and to forestall federal oversight, the servicers have argued that they act on
behalf of the federal government—because of their contractual relationships
with the Department of Education—as a defense.265 In most of these cases, in a
role reversal of the traditional principal–agent relationship, the servicers have
been explicitly encouraged or supported by the Department of Education.266
Outside the context of government contracting, an entity potentially
designated a principal has a powerful incentive to deny the existence of an
agency relationship, because otherwise that principal faces vicarious liability

Summary Judgment at 2, 22-24, Chae, 2007 WL 9706711 (No. 07-cv-02319), 2008 WL
2844792, ECF No. 154 (asserting a preemption defense); Verified Answer of Defendants
Navient Corporation; Navient Solutions, LLC; Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. &
General Revenue Corporation to Revised First Amended Complaint at 20-22, People v.
Navient Corp., No. CGC-18-567732 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2019) (asserting a
preemption defense); Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motions to Strike & to
Dismiss Plaintiff ’s First Amended Class Action Complaint at 1-2, 13-17, Nelson, 2017
WL 6501919 (No. 17-cv-00183), 2017 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 99978, at *11-12, 3341, ECF No. 29 (asserting a preemption defense); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint at 1-2, 9-13, State v. Navient Corp., No. 17-2-01115-1, 2017 Wash. Super.
LEXIS 14368 (Wash. Super. Ct. July 17, 2017) (asserting a preemption defense);
Commonwealth v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018
WL 1137520, at *1-2, *4-5, *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2018) (rejecting PHEAA’s state
sovereign-immunity defense); Navient Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support
of Their Motion to Dismiss at 2, 5, 15-22, Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 354 F. Supp.
3d 529 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (No. 17-cv-01814), 2017 WL 8683601, ECF No. 24 (asserting a
preemption defense); Defendants’ Combined Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss & Motion to Strike Class Allegations at 1, 8-11, Travis, 460 F. Supp. 3d 269
(No. 17-cv-04885), 2017 WL 7051496, ECF No. 43-1 (asserting a preemption defense);
Defendant’s Motion to Strike Class Allegations & to Dismiss & Incorporated
Memorandum of Law at 14-17, Daniel, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1319 (No. 17-cv-02503), 2018 WL
11232857, ECF No. 28 (asserting a preemption defense); Memorandum of Points &
Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 12-16, Genna, 2012 WL
1339482 (No. 11-cv-07371), ECF No. 4 (asserting a preemption defense).
264. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint
at 1-3, New York ex rel. James v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 19-cv-09155,
2020 WL 2097640 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2020), ECF No. 41 [hereinafter James Defendant’s
Memorandum of Law] (arguing that a lawsuit by New York’s attorney general should
be dismissed because: (1) PHEAA, by virtue of its relationship with the federal
Department of Education, enjoyed derivative sovereign immunity and
intergovernmental immunity; (2) the Higher Education Act expressly preempted state
legislation; and (3) state legislation conflicted with the Higher Education Act).
265. See, e.g., Brief of Appellee, supra note 230, at 11, 35 (asserting that the defendant was
protected by the “federal-ness” of its mission to service federal student loans).
266. See sources cited infra note 271.
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for an alleged agent’s tortious conduct.267 But it costs the government principal,
protected by the sovereign shield, nothing to advocate for extension of its
sovereign perquisites to a contractor. In fact, as described in this Subpart, it
subtly serves to increase federal power. The Department of Education’s
conduct is less surprising when considered through the lens of this inverted
agency analysis.268
In this Subpart, we first consider the ways in which servicers—
individually and as a group—exploit sovereign-shield defenses to avoid liability
under state law. Servicers have relied primarily, but not exclusively, on a
preemption defense to argue that they cannot be liable for violations of state
tort and consumer-protection laws. In each case, the servicers have argued that
state law is preempted by the federal Higher Education Act.269 They assert that,
because federal contractors must comply with federal laws governing their
conduct, they should enjoy protection from potentially applicable state
laws.270
The Department of Education has expressly and repeatedly supported its
contractors’ sovereign-shield claims, seeking to expand the scope of doctrinal
protection to benefit student-loan servicers. The Department’s multiple federal
statements of interest supporting preemption findings271 indicate the close
267. The risk of vicarious liability is real. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental

268.
269.

270.

271.

Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1752 (1996) (“[I]n huge
numbers of decided cases non-negligent defendants are held liable only because they
are the employers of the faulty employees.”).
See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 650-52 (7th Cir.
2019); Hyland v. Navient Corp., No. 18-cv-09031, 2019 WL 2918238, at *5-8 (S.D.N.Y.
July 8, 2019); Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 354 F. Supp. 3d 529, 547-52 (M.D. Pa. 2018),
aff ’d, 967 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2020); Daniel v. Navient Sols., LLC, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1319,
1323-24 (M.D. Fla. 2018); Genna v. Sallie Mae, Inc., No. 11-cv-07371, 2012 WL 1339482,
at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2012).
See, e.g., Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d 112, 123-25 (D.
Conn. 2020) (citing Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956)) (holding that a
state’s licensing regime impermissibly infringed upon the federal regulatory and
legislative scheme to choose federal contractors).
For example, the federal government filed statements in Student Loan Servicing
Alliance v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 36 (D.D.C. 2018), Commonwealth v.
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018 WL
1137520, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2018), and Pennsylvania Higher Education
Assistance Agency v. Perez, 416 F. Supp. 3d 75, 93 (D. Conn. 2019). Although a slightly
different context, the federal Department of Veterans Affairs, upset with the way that
the State of California has been investigating for-profit colleges, has threatened to strip
the state of its contract to regulate GI Bill benefits. See Adam Ashton, Veterans Affairs
Moves to Strip California’s Power in Fight over For-Profit Schools, SACRAMENTO BEE
(updated Sept. 23, 2019, 5:35 AM), https://perma.cc/P2MW-QB4S. In both cases, the
federal government is stepping in to support its corporate education “partners.”
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relationship between the agency and its contractors. Servicers have asserted
preemption defenses in part by pointing to interpretive guidance issued by the
Department of Education, which has asserted that contractor servicers should
not be subject to state consumer-protection law.272 This guidance came about
because the servicers’ trade group lobbied the Department of Education to
intervene and declare that the Higher Education Act preempts state law and
regulation.273 In response, the Department “clarif[ied] its view that State
regulation of the servicing of Direct Loans impedes uniquely Federal interests,
and that State regulation of the servicing of the FFEL Program is preempted to
the extent that it undermines uniform administration of the program.”274 The
Department, in court filings, has urged a broad reading of its guidance to bar
state actions against contractor servicers “whether they are enacted
legislatively or implied judicially in the context of a tort suit.”275 This was not

272. See, e.g., Brief of Appellee, supra note 230, at 20-24 (citing numerous Department of

Education filings and interpretive statements supporting servicers’ sovereign-shield
defenses); see also Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of
Education’s Federal Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83
Fed. Reg. 10,619 (Mar. 12, 2018). The servicers did not tell courts that they themselves
specifically asked the Department to issue this guidance, a disclosure they might have
rightly feared would result in less deference to the Department’s views. See infra
note 273 and accompanying text.
273. Michael Stratford, How the Student Loan Industry Lobbied DeVos to Fight State Regulations,
POLITICO (Aug. 15, 2019, 5:01 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/3KYM-VHB5.
274. Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal
Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. at 10,620. The
Department in its notice drew on Boyle for the principle that an area “ ‘involving
uniquely Federal interests’ . . . must be ‘governed exclusively by Federal law.’ ” Id. at
10,619 (quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988)). For a fulsome
review of Boyle and its requirements, see notes 91-103 and the accompanying text
above. It is also worth noting that courts assessing the Department’s guidance have
afforded it only Skidmore deference, concluding that the guidance was unpersuasive
based on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see, e.g., LawsonRoss v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 955 F.3d 908, 921 n.13 (11th Cir. 2020)
(applying Skidmore deference and finding the Department’s notice unpersuasive); see
also Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 49-50 (concluding that although
Skidmore deference provided the proper test for assessing the Department’s notice, “no
deference is owed to an ‘agency’s conclusion that state law is preempted’ ” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009))).
275. Defendants-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 16, Navient Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 967 F.3d
273 (3d Cir. 2020) (No. 19-2116), 2019 WL 3338049 (quoting Brief of PlaintiffIntervenor-Appellee at 11, Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 0856154), 2009 WL 2444650).
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the view of the Obama Administration, which explicitly argued that the
Higher Education Act did not preempt state law.276
Courts have had mixed reactions to servicers’ preemption defenses to state
law liability. For example, in Chae v. SLM Corp., a Ninth Circuit panel
concluded that one provision of the Higher Education Act preempted state
consumer-protection law.277 In Chae, the court relied primarily on
congressional intent (factor one) to determine that the plaintiffs’ claims were
preempted by federal law.278 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that the
contractor defendant engaged in “unfair and fraudulent business practices” in
violation of California law, because the state’s law did not prohibit the
company’s practices but instead addressed potential misrepresentations and
disclosures, and a provision of the Higher Education Act preempted any state
disclosure requirements.279 The Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the
Third Circuit subsequently distinguished the facts of Chae to permit claimants
to proceed in Nelson v. Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc.,280 LawsonRoss v. Great Lakes Higher Education Corp.,281 and Pennsylvania v. Navient
Corp.,282 respectively. The courts distinguished affirmative misrepresentations
from state disclosure requirements, reading Chae as requiring preemption only
of the latter.283 In those cases, the circuit courts also looked primarily to
congressional intent to evaluate the preemption claims.284 In Nelson, the
276. See, e.g., Sanchez v. ASA Coll., Inc., No. 14-cv-05006, 2015 WL 3540836, at *4 n.2

277.

278.
279.
280.

281.
282.
283.
284.

(S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015). Indeed, a court in a different case later cited the change of
position itself as a factor in assessing whether to show any deference to the
Department of Education’s interpretation. Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at
50 (holding that the Department’s “Preemption Notice fails the Skidmore test most
notably because the agency’s view represents a stark, unexplained change in . . .
position”).
593 F.3d at 942 (holding that 20 U.S.C. § 1098g, which states that “[l]oans made, insured,
or guaranteed pursuant to a program authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education
Act . . . shall not be subject to any disclosure requirements of any State law,” preempted
California consumer-protection law asserted by the plaintiffs as the basis of several of
their claims (alteration in original) (quoting § 1098g)).
Id. at 942-45; see also supra Part I.B.1.
Chae, 593 F.3d at 942-43.
928 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that a borrower’s claims were not preempted
“to the extent she is alleging that Great Lakes made false or misleading affirmative
representations to her in the counseling process”).
955 F.3d 908, 916-23 (11th Cir. 2020) (employing express, conflict, and field preemption
analyses to conclude that the borrowers’ claims were not preempted).
967 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the Higher Education Act does not
preempt “claims based on affirmative misrepresentations”).
See, e.g., Nelson, 928 F.3d at 649-50.
See id. at 648; Lawson-Ross, 955 F.3d at 916; Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273,
284-86 (3d Cir. 2020).
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Seventh Circuit distinguished statements that the defendant made
“voluntarily” from the “disclosure requirements” specifically preempted by
federal law.285 This exemplifies the analysis of a contractor’s discretion (factors
three and four): The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims resting on
conduct that was “not required by federal law” could proceed.286 In yet another
case, the Southern District of New York similarly distinguished “affirmative
representations” from disclosures in order to find that some, but not all, of the
state laws relied upon by the New York Attorney General were preempted.287
Each case relied on the state law’s specific language and implementation and
the fact-specific allegations in the complaint.
The confusion with respect to preemption analysis is palpable. In Reavis v.
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, Montana’s highest court
reversed a lower court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s claims rested on state
law that was preempted by the Higher Education Act after the plaintiff argued
on appeal that the trial court judge erroneously relied on both Chae and the
Department of Education’s interpretive guidance.288 The state supreme court
expressly adopted a limited understanding of Chae and did not rely on the
Department’s statement.289
Consider next the ways in which servicers have sought to expand the
sovereign shield as it relates to federal courts’ jurisdiction. In New York ex rel.
James v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency,290 for example, PHEAA
threw every possible defense against the wall to see what might stick.291 In
addition to asserting that the New York Attorney General’s claims were
preempted by federal law, PHEAA submitted a letter to the court arguing that
PHEAA, as a government contractor, was entitled to derivative sovereign
immunity (that is, Yearsley immunity), which deprived the court of subjectmatter jurisdiction.292 PHEAA also relied on its lack of discretion (factors three
285. 928 F.3d at 648-49 (“[Plaintiff] is complaining about at least some deceptive statements

286.
287.

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

that Great Lakes chose to make voluntarily, not because federal law required them.
Great Lakes could have avoided these claims by remaining silent. State law could
impose liability on these affirmative misrepresentations without imposing additional
disclosure requirements on Great Lakes, and thus avoid preemption under § 1098g.”).
Id. at 648.
New York ex rel. James v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 19-cv-09155, 2020
WL 2097640, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2020) (holding that certain claims were explicitly
preempted by the Higher Education Act).
See Appellant’s Opening Brief, Reavis v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 467 P.3d
588 (Mont. 2020) (No. DA 19-0510), 2019 WL 7877836, at *9.
Reavis, 467 P.3d at 591, 593-94.
2020 WL 2097640.
See supra note 264.
Letter from Marjorie J. Peerce to the Hon. Edgardo Ramos at 2, James, 2020 WL
2097640 (No. 19-cv-09155), ECF No. 15 [hereinafter James Dec. 2, 2019 Letter].
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and four), asserting that “in servicing the loans, PHEAA complied with and did
not exceed the terms of the contract with the Department or the Department’s
direction.”293 As of this writing, the Southern District of New York has not
issued a final ruling on Yearsley’s application to PHEAA as a servicer of
government-owned loans, but it has ruled that Yearsley immunity is not a
jurisdictional bar.294 Rather, the court held that Yearsley immunity must be
assessed on the merits, and “the record at [the motion to dismiss] stage does not
permit the Court to dismiss the Complaint under Yearsley.”295 In yet another
filing, further collapsing the sovereign-shield defenses, PHEAA asked the court
to permit additional briefing if the “Court believes that the Boyle immunity
analysis may apply.”296
The recent increase in derivative-immunity assertions is unsurprising.
Lawyers representing government contractors have publicly asserted that the
2016 Campbell-Ewald opinion extended Yearsley immunity to all government
contractors.297 These lawyers have argued that “[a]fter Campbell-Ewald, there is
no reason that the Yearsley derivative sovereign immunity defense should not
be asserted by all Government service contractors, not just those working on
public works projects, effectively making the three-prong Boyle analysis
largely irrelevant, at least with respect to Government service contracts.”298
And SLSA joined with Navient, Nelnet, and PHEAA to lobby the Federal
Communications Commission to offer supplemental agency instruction on
Campbell-Ewald supporting their argument for a broad reading of the case to
grant “immun[ity] from TCPA liability when [federal contractors] comply
with the federal government’s directions” regardless of agency status.299 This
assertion ignores the import of congressional intent, character of the
contractor and its contract, and effect on policymaking and decisionmaking
(factors one, two, and five), suggesting that the preemption analysis underlying
Boyle has been subsumed by Yearsley immunity.

293. Id.
294. James, 2020 WL 2097640, at *6-8 (recognizing that there is a circuit split on the issue of
295.
296.

297.
298.
299.

whether Yearsley is a jurisdictional question).
Id. at *7-8.
James Defendant’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 264, at 14 n.2. However, PHEAA
did not pursue the argument, and the court deemed it waived. James, 2020 WL 2097640,
at *7 n.3.
See Sher & Vogel, supra note 7.
Id.
Student Loan Servicing All., Navient Corp., Nelnet Servicing, LLC & Pa. Higher Educ.
Assistance Agency, Comment Letter on Interpretation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act in Light of the D.C. Circuit’s ACA International Decision, at ii (June 13,
2018), https://perma.cc/TQR2-RFSZ.
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Consider next the ways in which student-loan servicers use sovereignshield principles to avoid state regulation. State legislatures, governors, and
attorneys general have proposed legislation that seeks to regulate or oversee
student-loan servicers operating in their state. As of this writing, at least eleven
states and the District of Columbia have introduced “student loan borrower
bills of rights.”300 Those bills create licensing schemes, set reporting
requirements, establish new regulatory schemes, and allow for the creation of
state student-loan ombudsmen.
Student-loan servicers, invoking the sovereign shield, are fighting this
state regulation. SLSA sued to block the District of Columbia’s studentborrower bill of rights, the Student Loan Ombudsman Establishment and
Servicing Regulation Amendment Act of 2016.301 The servicers argued that
they were protected from regulation based on the doctrines of
intergovernmental immunity and preemption.302 The federal government
filed a statement of interest supporting the servicers in that case,303 and the
Department of Education addressed the topic specifically in its March 2018
guidance.304 Before the parties voluntarily dismissed the case while an appeal
was pending,305 the trial court issued an opinion that appears to have
300. See supra note 223. In several other states, bills have been proposed but not yet enacted.
301.
302.
303.

304.

305.

See, e.g., H.R. 2922, 57th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2020); S. 2595, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2020).
See Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 36 (D.D.C.
2018) (challenging D.C. Law 21-214).
Id. at 46.
Statement of Interest of the United States at 1-2, 22, Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F.
Supp. 3d 26 (No. 18-cv-00640), ECF No. 20; see also Brief of Amici Curiae States of New
York et al. in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment at 2, Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d 26 (No. 18-cv00640), ECF No. 29 (“Indeed, [SLSA] seeks to oust States from the field of federal student
loan servicing altogether; and the United States similarly seeks to exempt all servicers
of federal-owned or -guaranteed student loans from state-law requirements, on the
ground that these servicers’ conduct should be governed exclusively by federal laws,
regulations, and contracts.”).
Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal
Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,620
(Mar. 12, 2018); see also Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 303, at 14
(arguing, based in part on the Department’s March 2018 guidance, that “D.C.’s attempt
to second guess through its licensing requirement Education’s determination of which
servicers to contract with ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,’ and is thus preempted by federal law”
(quoting Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012))).
Although the case was originally appealed by both parties, in February 2019, the
District of Columbia filed an unopposed motion to withdraw its appeal. See Consent
Motion of the Appellants to Voluntarily Dismiss Their Appeal at 1, Student Loan
Servicing All. v. Taylor, No. 19-7001, 2019 WL 2158372 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 2019). SLSA
did the same in April of the same year. See Unopposed Motion of the Appellant to
Voluntarily Dismiss Its Appeal at 1, Taylor, 2019 WL 2158372 (No. 19-7001).
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attempted a compromise, but in practice handed servicers a significant victory.
That court drew on Boyle-related preemption principles and intergovernmental
immunity to conclude that: (1) federal legislation did not expressly preempt the
regulations adopted by the District of Columbia;306 and (2) the Higher
Education Act similarly did not occupy the field of regulation to preclude state
action;307 but crucially, (3) the D.C. regulatory regime nevertheless constituted
an “obstacle” to the federal legislative objective for certain classes of federal
student loans308 and so was preempted with respect to those loans.309
PHEAA made similar assertions in its fight with the New York Attorney
General, first asserting defenses based on preemption and Yearsley immunity
and requesting additional time to argue Boyle immunity.310 PHEAA then made
the additional argument that New York’s state law claims were barred under
the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity,311 telling the court that “[t]he
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity is thematically consistent with the
preemption and derivative sovereign immunity arguments already articulated
in PHEAA’s [previous] letter.”312 With specific reference to the effect on “the
federal services that the U.S. Department of Education . . . hired PHEAA to
perform” (factor five), PHEAA essentially collapsed the three sovereign-shield
doctrines’ analyses.313 Speaking only to New York’s relevant laws, which
address “affirmative disclosures that are false, misleading, or otherwise
unlawful,” the court ultimately held that applying the state law to a federal
306. Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 53-55.
307. Id. at 59.
308. The court distinguished among loans made by the federal government, those held by

309.

310.

311.
312.
313.

the federal government, and those made and held by private lenders, such as banks,
pursuant to the now-extinct federal guaranteed-student-loan program, the FFELP. Id.
at 61 (“For purposes of this conflict analysis, the Court must compare the particular
regulations that apply to each of the three types of loans at issue here: (1) the [direct]
loans, which the federal government owns and are serviced pursuant to federal
government contracts; (2) the Government-Owned FFELP loans, for which the federal
government was originally the reinsurer or guarantee agency, but later purchased . . . ;
and (3) the Commercial FFELP loans, the private loans that the government reinsures
or guarantees.”).
See id. at 72, 75-76. Having drawn distinctions among different classes of federal student
loans, see supra note 308, the court concluded that the federal Higher Education Act did
not preclude the District of Columbia’s legislation insofar as it affected FFELP loans
made by private, nongovernmental lenders. Id. at 66-73.
New York ex rel. James v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 19-cv-09155, 2020
WL 2097640, at *1, *7 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2020) (summarizing PHEAA’s claims); James
Dec. 2, 2019 Letter, supra note 292, at 2-3.
James Defendant’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 264, at 17-20.
Letter from Marjorie J. Peerce to the Hon. Edgardo Ramos at 1, James, 2020 WL
2097640 (No. 19-cv-09155), ECF No. 27 [hereinafter James Dec. 30, 2019 Letter].
Id.
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contractor did “not transform an otherwise neutral law into a direct regulation
of the federal government.”314 The court found that only the attorney general’s
claims based on “failure to disclose information” were preempted.315
Finally, servicers are using sovereign-shield arguments to avoid even
federal oversight. With support from the Department of Education, the
servicers have argued that by virtue of their contractual relationships with the
federal government, they need not comply with requests for information from
federal regulatory bodies and legislative oversight committees. In 2017, the
Department of Education admonished its contracted servicers not to produce
certain records to the CFPB for supervisory examinations.316 And in 2018,
when the CFPB sought to act in its supervisory role to inspect servicing
companies running student-loan call centers, the Department of Education,
citing privacy concerns, instructed contractors not to share information with
the CFPB.317
In September 2019, the chairman of the House Education Committee,
Representative Bobby Scott, sought testimony from the president and CEO of
PHEAA about its management of the federal Public Service Loan Forgiveness
Program.318 The executive, James H. Steeley, refused the invitation,319 hinting
at sovereign-shield rationales without citing to any specific doctrine or
relevant factor. Mr. Steeley wrote: “As a federal servicer, PHEAA is strictly
bound by the laws, regulations and guidance of the programs put forward by
Congress and the Department; therefore, I must respectfully decline your
invitation.”320
When one doctrinal track is blocked, servicers attempt another sovereignshield defense, exploiting the confusion between doctrines and reaching across
theories and principles to evade liability and oversight. Servicers boil the doctrines
down to a simple assertion: We are engaged in federal business—so it is none of yours.
Such a way of thinking underlies Steeley’s response to the congressional request

314. James, 2020 WL 2097640, at *9 (explicitly noting that the New York Attorney General

“does not seek to impose new disclosure requirements on PHEAA”).
315. Id. at *15.
316. See Letter from Kathleen L. Kraninger, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Sen.

Elizabeth Warren (Apr. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/ES3S-9EK7.
317. Chris Arnold, Exclusive: Turf War Blocked CFPB From Helping Fix Student Loan

Forgiveness Program, NPR (Oct. 15, 2019, 10:52 AM ET), https://perma.cc/8CL2-RXCW.
318. Stratford, supra note 228.
319. Id. It is important to note that Mr. Steeley refused an invitation, not a congressional

subpoena.
320. Id. (quoting Steeley’s letter to Scott).
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for information321 and Great Lakes’ argument that the “federal-ness” of the
federal student-lending regime precluded the company’s liability.322
Consider a few more examples of how servicers deploy these arguments. In
multiple state and federal courts, the servicing giant PHEAA argued that it was
immune to suit because of its relationship with the state of Pennsylvania.323
When those arguments failed,324 PHEAA argued to another court that it was
immune from suit because of its relationship with the federal government.325
Other servicers have attempted to use similar arguments, invoking Boyle’s
language on conflict preemption to support their claims.326
In a different case filed by PHEAA, the Department of Education (itself a
defendant in the action) argued that Connecticut’s attempts to regulate PHEAA
through licensing were preempted by federal law and constituted an illegal
regulation of the federal government in violation of intergovernmentalimmunity principles.327 PHEAA’s counsel subsequently filed a letter in the
Southern District of New York seeking to “include the doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity as a basis for dismissal” of a complaint brought
by New York’s Attorney General.328 In that letter, PHEAA’s counsel cited
specifically to the federal government’s statement of interest in the
Connecticut case, seeking to expand the intergovernmental-immunity

321. See supra notes 319-20 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
323. Commonwealth v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018

324.
325.
326.
327.

328.

WL 1137520, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2018); Pele v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency, 628 F. App’x 870, 871 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (rejecting PHEAA’s
argument, at the summary-judgment stage, that it was entitled to summary judgment
because it was an “arm of the [state]” and so protected by the Eleventh Amendment);
Brief for Appellees Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency & Vermont
Student Assistance Corp. at 17-44, United States ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ.
Assistance Agency, 804 F.3d 646 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-1093), 2015 WL 1306499, ECF
No. 51 (arguing that PHEAA is an “arm of the State” and consequently protected from
suit).
Oberg, 804 F.3d at 650 (concluding that PHEAA did not enjoy Pennsylvania’s status as a
state and thus was subject to suit under the False Claims Act).
James Dec. 2, 2019 Letter, supra note 292, at 1-2.
See, e.g., Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 650-51, 651 n.3 (7th
Cir. 2019); Brief of Appellee, supra note 230, at 28.
See Statement of Interest of the United States at 8-14, Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency v. Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d 112 (D. Conn. 2020) (No. 18-cv-01114), ECF No. 70
(arguing that Connecticut’s regulatory scheme is preempted by the Higher Education
Act and the Privacy Act); id. at 14-17 (arguing that Connecticut’s licensing scheme
improperly regulates and discriminates against the federal government).
James Dec. 30, 2019 Letter, supra note 312, at 1.
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argument beyond licensing and block the traditional consumer-protection
complaints asserted by New York.329
Servicers like PHEAA are using arguments based on the principles
underlying federal preemption, sovereign immunity, and intergovernmental
immunity ambiguously and interchangeably to evade state and federal law,
regulation, and oversight. They are doing so with the support of their agency
partner, the Department of Education. And they are fighting these fights at the
expense of those seeking to hold them accountable for their conduct:
consumers, states, and federal oversight bodies.
This phenomenon is not limited to student-loan servicers.330 The
servicers’ arguments have been and likely will continue to be used by other
nongovernmental actors seeking to further the size and impermeability of the
sovereign shield.331
C. Beyond Capture: The Alliance of Goliaths
As shown above, the student-loan servicers are not operating alone; they
have the full backing of their agency partner, the Department of Education.
The Department has filed court papers supporting servicers’ attempts to
dismiss state law claims against them.332 The Department directed its
contracted servicers to ignore requests from the CFPB.333 And Jack Remondi,
the CEO of Navient, along with servicer trade groups, expressly lobbied the
Department to issue guidance that states lacked the authority to police
servicing activities.334 Over the objection of state attorneys general, state

329. Id.
330. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., Defendants’ Reply in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 1-4,

Rose v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 10-cv-5067, 2010 WL 8435397 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2010),
2010 WL 4776960, ECF No. 33 (relying on Chae in seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs’ state
law claims related to the defendant’s debt-cancellation contracts); Notice of Motion &
Motion of Chase Bank USA, N.A. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim;
Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support Thereof at 2, 19, Milgram v. Chase
Bank USA, N.A., No. 10-cv-00336 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2010), 2010 WL 2219307, ECF
No. 14 (discussing Chae in support of the defendant’s preemption arguments pursuant
to the National Bank Act).
332. See supra note 303; see also Commonwealth v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency,
No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018 WL 1137520, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2018)
(describing a filing by the Department of Education in favor of the defendant servicer);
Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 36, 50 (D.D.C.
2018) (same).
333. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
334. See Stratford, supra note 273.
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banking regulators, and the National Governors Association, then-Secretary of
Education Betsy DeVos issued guidance in line with those requests.335
As we have argued in this Article, expanding the sovereign shield enables
and fosters a mutually beneficial alliance between these entities. Such an
alliance is related to, but broader than, the traditional notion of capture.336 But
like capture, the alliance of Goliaths shifts policy “away from the public
interest and toward industry interest.”337 This alliance is both created and
reinforced by a “revolving door” between government agencies and their
contractors.338 Sally Stroup, for example, spent more than ten years on the
staff of PHEAA,339 worked as a staffer for the House Committee on Education
and the Workforce, had a brief stopover as a lobbyist for Apollo Education
Group,340 which owns the for-profit entity, the University of Phoenix,341 and
then was named the Assistant Secretary of Postsecondary Education in
President George W. Bush’s Department of Education.342 One of President
335. See Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal

336.

337.

338.

339.
340.

341.
342.

Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,620
(Mar. 12, 2018); Stratford, supra note 273.
“Capture” is “shorthand for the phenomenon whereby regulated entities wield their
superior organizational capacities to secure favorable agency outcomes at the expense
of the diffuse public.” Nicholas Bagley, Response, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE
ALSO 1, 2 (2010). For further discussion of regulatory capture, see David Thaw,
Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 333 (2014) (“The term ‘regulatory
capture’ traditionally evokes negative connotations of backroom dealing, placement of
industry-friendly individuals in key regulatory positions, and the breakdown of the
regulatory process that grinds it to a proverbial halt.”). We take up capture further in
The Sovereign in Commerce. See Elengold & Glater, supra note 6 (manuscript at Part III.B).
Daniel Carpenter, Detecting and Measuring Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 57, 63 (Daniel Carpenter
& David A. Moss eds., 2014).
See VERKUIL, supra note 1, at 5 (“Outsourcing can lead to corruption of our bureaucracy,
at least of its politically appointed members. Political officials, who are appointed for
short periods and enter service through the famous revolving door, sometimes utilize
outsourcing both as a means of getting results and as a way of preserving later career
opportunities.” (footnote omitted)).
Ryann Liebenthal, The Incredible, Rage-Inducing Inside Story of America’s Student Debt
Machine, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 2018), https://perma.cc/3ZZY-DQT3.
See Sally L. Stroup—Assistant Secretary of Postsecondary Education, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.,
https://perma.cc/4C9E-B5VD (last updated Apr. 17, 2006); see also Doug Lederman, New
(But Familiar) Face at Career College Group, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 6, 2012),
https://perma.cc/PA6V-PY7C.
Patricia Cohen & Chad Bray, University of Phoenix Owner, Apollo Education Group, Will
Be Taken Private, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/B469-YLSG.
Stroup, Sally, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://perma.cc/8KRG-Q5X9 (archived Feb. 9,
2021). Others have followed similar trajectories. See, e.g., David Halperin, For-Profit
College Where Top DeVos Aide Worked Is Paying $30 Million to Settle FTC Deception Probe,
REPUBLIC REP. (Aug. 2, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://perma.cc/9ZXU-2C26 (recognizing that
Diane Auer Jones, a top Department of Education official, came from top positions at
footnote continued on next page
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Donald Trump’s most trusted campaign advisors, David Urban, leads the
lobbying firm representing PHEAA, and Kathleen Smith, a former high-level
aide to Secretary DeVos, was hired by PHEAA as senior vice president and
director of federal relations.343 A former PHEAA executive, Robert Cameron,
was named the CFPB’s private student-loan ombudsman, a job that has been
called “the federal government’s top [student-loan] watchdog.”344 While a
sociological study of the ways that personnel and personal relationships may
enable industry to wield influence is beyond the scope of this Article, we note
that these sorts of ties both facilitate and contribute to government adoption of
positions and policies favorable to private businesses.
III. Normative Analysis
This Part develops a normative critique of the expansion of the sovereign
shield to private government contractors. It argues that such expansion
reinforces an alliance between the executive branch and its corporate
contractors.345 We fear that the creation and perpetuation of this alliance
represent a shift in the delicate balance among the executive branch, the
legislative branch, states, corporations, and consumers. Private companies and
the executive branch work together to avoid liability and beat back state and
the for-profit company Career Education Corporation, which was under investigation
by the Federal Trade Commission for predatory tactics).
343. Michael Stratford, Student-Loan Behemoth Tightens Its Ties to Trump and DeVos, POLITICO
(Sept. 9, 2019, 5:03 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/NY9G-RBWH.
344. Ken Sweet, Trump Appoints Student Loan Industry Exec to Watchdog Job, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Aug. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/8LYE-K8AU.
345. This argument is slightly different from, but analogous to, that made by Jon Michaels
in analyzing the risks of privatization “workarounds.” We argue that the partnership
between for-profit contractors and the executive branch not only enables the
expansion of federal authority, but also affirmatively (1) undermines state legislative
and regulatory power; and (2) shifts the balance of power between the private sector
and consumers. We see a multidimensional power grab consistent with Michaels’
analysis, which identified the ways in which the executive can: (1) expand its powers
by turning to private contractors to bypass laws that apply only to the government;
(2) bind future successors through long-term contracts; (3) sideline civil servants by
turning to private contractors to build an administrative record; and (4) expand the
government’s footprint without expanding the civil service or military workforce. See
generally Michaels, supra note 6. Michaels argues that workarounds
are executive aggrandizing. Specifically, workarounds . . . provide the outsourcing agency
with the means of achieving distinct public policy goals that—but for the pretext of
technocratic outsourcing—would be impossible or much more difficult to attain in the
ordinary course of nonprivatized public administration. In short, workarounds enable the
executive to exercise greater unilateral discretion—at the expense of the legislature, the
judiciary, the people, and successor administrations.

Id. at 719.
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federal legislative and regulatory efforts. The federal government benefits at
the expense of the states; the executive branch benefits at the expense of the
legislative branch; and corporate interests benefit at the expense of consumers.
This is a symbiotic relationship, in that both the private contractors and the
executive branch benefit by avoiding legal exposure based on contract
implementation and by preferencing federal, specifically executive, interests
over state interests.
The analysis of the phenomenon we identify draws on accounts from
constitutional law scholars, administrative law scholars, and consumer law
scholars. But in its entirety, it falls through doctrinal cracks.346 It is not only a
story about contractors taking advantage of the executive branch.347 Nor is it
only a story of a power-hungry executive branch taking advantage of the selfinterest of contractors.348 Nor is it a story about unilateral capture, where
industry hijacks an agency for personal, professional, and typically pecuniary
gain.349 Rather, this is a story of an alliance of Goliaths: the federal
administration and its contractors working together to expand their collective
power. The benefits to the contractors—less accountability and more money—
seem obvious. But consider also the benefits to the federal executive branch: By
using a private contractor to complete a task, the federal executive can sidestep
accountability regimes, because the private actor may not be subject to publicrecords requests or other oversight mechanisms that apply to federal
346. For a more detailed literature review and analysis, see Elengold & Glater, supra note 6

(manuscript at Part III).
347. Many scholars who have taken an interest in government contractors have raised

concerns about a lack of constitutional and structural accountability, which permits
contractors to engage in questionable behavior. See e.g., Freeman & Minnow, supra
note 1, at 2 (“The primary concern, voiced in recent years by critics in public policy
circles and in academia, is that the ubiquity of governance-by-private-contractors
strikingly outstrips our legal and political capacities of oversight meant to ensure that
the contractors’ execution of these governmental functions complies with democratic
norms.”). As a result, improper behavior by contractors evades regulatory oversight.
See, e.g., Natalie Kitroeff, Boeing Employees Mocked F.A.A. and ‘Clowns’ Who Designed 737
Max, N.Y. TIMES (updated Jan. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/HP4J-JSMF (describing
Boeing employees’ efforts to conceal airplane problems, which contributed to two
accidents that killed 346 people, from the Federal Aviation Administration).
348. Cf. Michaels, supra note 6, at 719 (describing privatization as a “powerful, potentially
transformative phenomenon [that] (1) raises novel questions that sound in separation
of powers, intergenerational sovereignty, and democratic theory, and (2) has been
overshadowed by the dominant, but analytically orthogonal, efficiency versus
accountability debate”).
349. See William J. Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT, supra
note 337, at 25, 45 (arguing that viewed in a historical context, regulatory change and
innovation did not occur against the backdrop of a “simple binary of public interest
and private capture”).
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agencies,350 or to the demands of a coequal branch of the federal
government.351 This explains why we do not see the federal government, as
principal, trying to distance itself from potential misconduct by its contractors
(its agents), as is typical in cases involving misconduct by agents.352 Instead,
when the contractors assert the sovereign shield, the executive backs them
up.353 At the same time, when it uses a contractor, the federal government
disempowers the states, which by virtue of their traditional police powers have
a strong claim to authority over the kinds of conduct engaged in by the
private-sector actors hired by the sovereign.
This Part traces the consequences of this alliance, returning to studentloan servicing to provide one concrete account; it is surely not the only one.
We first distinguish our concerns from those animating many debates over the
desirability of federal outsourcing, which often involve disagreements over
efficiency. By contrast, our subject is the effect of the expansion of the
sovereign shield through doctrine: the reduction of avenues for consumer
recovery. If consumers cannot hold contractors liable for harms they cause,
accountability depends on the very federal agency that acts in concert with the
contractor. Lastly, we identify a consequence of the allocation of authority to
the executive to hold a contractor accountable: a shift in the distribution of
power that affects the structural constitutional principles of federalism and
separation of powers.354
A. The Scope of Our Claim
Debates over federal reliance on contractors often center on the financial
benefits to the government. Many have argued that outsourcing government
services is less expensive, more efficient, and results in higher-quality
outcomes than retaining the work within the government. Consequently, the
argument goes, outsourcing is better for citizens, both as consumers and
taxpayers.355 Stan Soloway and Alan Chvotkin, both of whom have significant
350. See Kelman, supra note 255, at 185; see also VERKUIL, supra note 1, at 13 (warning that the

“contractor approach to executive authority hides decisions from public view”).
351. See supra notes 292, 316-20 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 271 (demonstrating that the Department of Education regularly files

statements of interest and otherwise supports its contractors’ utilization of sovereignshield defenses).
354. See Brown, supra note 1, at 533-34 (arguing that the “principle of democratic
accountability that springs from the structural Constitution” could be a theoretical
basis to analyze, assess, and curb problems associated with outsourcing government
work to private contractors).
355. See generally Stan Soloway & Alan Chvotkin, Federal Contracting in Context: What Drives
It, How to Improve It, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 192, 199 (arguing
footnote continued on next page
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experience with government contracting, argue that “[m]ost experts agree that
when properly managed, outsourcing, and perhaps more specifically the
competitive marketplace that underpins it, can and generally does drive higher
performance and improve service delivery.”356 It is expensive and timeconsuming to hire, train, and fire civil servants as compared to contractors.357
And a “graying” civil-service workforce is untrained to deal with technological
and business advances.358
Debates among scholars of public law have focused on a different set of
issues, unrelated to tangible costs, involving various institutional players—the
federal government, states, the branches of government, consumers, the
businesses that serve as contractors—depending on disciplinary orientation.
Constitutional scholars have focused their attention on the complex and
changing relationship between the states and the federal government.359
Administrative law scholars have focused attention on the ways in which the
“American ‘rule of law’ tradition, which provides that special laws apply to
government and officials to define their authority and protect citizens against
abuse,” does not apply to government contractors, undermining governmentaccountability measures.360 And consumer law scholars focus their attention
on the harms of businesses’ successful efforts to foreclose remedies for injured

356.
357.
358.
359.

360.

that government use of private contractors can confer benefits in terms of quality on
both the government as a hiring entity and on taxpayers); id. at 194.
Id. at 194.
See, e.g., id. at 197.
See id. at 199.
For examples of this approach, see Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
1695, 1700 (2017) (“[N]either the state nor the federal government presides over its own
empire. Instead, they govern shoulder-to-shoulder in a tight regulatory space . . . .”);
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1258 (2009) (analyzing “[u]ncooperative federalism,” which occurs, for example,
“when states carrying out the Patriot Act refuse to enforce the portions they deem
unconstitutional”); and Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization and the States, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1744 (2015) (analyzing “the relationship between [federal]
administrative agencies and political polarization” given the ability of states to advance
or hinder the goals of the federal executive).
See Dan Guttman, Government by Contract: Considering a Public Service Ethics to Match the
Reality of the “Blended” Public Work Force, EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY
REV. (2015), https://perma.cc/U8T2-H5R4 (arguing that two premises have long
provided the “framework” of federal contracting: first, that “fundamentally different
rules can and should govern officials and contractors,” and second, that “the application of
differing rules to public officials and contractors is acceptable because officials will in fact
have the capacity to account for contractors”). This framework can have deleterious
outcomes. See, e.g., MICHAELS, supra note 24, at 36; VERKUIL, supra note 1, at 105 (warning
that “privatized actions are often nontransparent,” not least because they may not be
subject to the Freedom of Information Act).
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consumers.361 Impunity for federal contractors not only risks harm to
consumers, but also contributes to what Paul Verkuil calls a “democracy
deficit” by undermining other accountability structures and weakening the
government’s ability to perform important functions on its own, should the
need arise.362 But no one group of scholars has focused on the implications of
the sovereign-shield phenomenon for each set of relevant players: the federal
executive, the federal legislature, states, businesses, and consumers.363
Extension of the sovereign shield may indirectly impose tangible costs,
too. The ability of federal contractors to evade oversight correspondingly
increases their ability to bilk the taxpayer, undermining the very cost and
efficiency rationales invoked to justify outsourcing in the first place.364 The
allure of lucrative jobs in the private sector may lead government officials to
put the good of a contractor ahead of the good of the public. The availability of
the sovereign shield mitigates the efficiency-enhancing effect of the market
because, for market participants in other contexts, there is no comparable
defense to liability, and contractors have a powerful incentive to invest
resources in obtaining sovereign-shield benefits—resources that otherwise
could be allocated to a safer and possibly less costly product or service.
Support for outsourcing has become increasingly bipartisan,365 so a change
in administration does not necessarily portend stronger executive oversight of
federal contractor conduct. Even if the federal executive branch holds a
contractor to account in an individual instance, that does not change the
doctrine, which leaves accountability in the future to the discretion of the
executive, and therefore neither alleviates our concerns nor changes our
analysis. Imagine that the federal Department of Education exercised closer
oversight over its servicer contractors; that would simply mean that other
entities, including state attorneys general and consumers, would not be forced
to sue to obtain redress for negligence or misconduct. In other words,
preserving the power of these other potential counterweights to the federal
executive power in no way prevents the federal executive from imposing
361. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1317

362.
363.
364.
365.

(2015) (“[C]onsequential features of transactions are becoming too opaque and
changeable for many consumers to shop well for themselves, and market structure
renders consumers unable to benefit from other consumers’ shopping. Consumer law
currently facilitates rather than ameliorates the effects of these technological
changes.”); Adam J. Levitin, The Fast and the Usurious: Putting the Brakes on Auto Lending
Abuses, 108 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1268 (2020) (describing the size of the auto-lending market
and the lack of industry-specific consumer-protection legislation).
VERKUIL, supra note 1, at 2-4.
See supra note 346.
Verkuil offers some choice examples of contractors run amok. See VERKUIL, supra
note 1, at 4-5.
See MICHAELS, supra note 24, at 99.
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accountability on its hired agents. Our concern is relevant not only in the
context of the Trump Administration, which scholars have noted was
spectacularly corrupt and venal.366 We suggest that fairness, accountability,
and consumer protection may all be better served if the federal government
and the states both have—and exercise—concurrent enforcement power. As it
currently exists, the sovereign shield stands in the way of state attorneys
general seeking to protect the people of their states.367
However, for this project, we need not delve deeply into the debate about
whether privatization, outsourcing, or government contracting is normatively
good or bad. The debate about whether the federal government should hire
private contractors presents a distinct issue.368 Instead, this Article queries
whether and under what circumstances a contractor should be able to take
advantage of its relationship with the executive branch to avoid liability or
oversight. We also expose the ways in which that phenomenon benefits
companies vis-à-vis consumers and the executive branch vis-à-vis other state
and federal governmental actors. Our companion piece, which offers a
doctrinal fix, further situates the phenomenon and analysis in the
constitutional, administrative, and consumer law scholarship.369 Gaining
insight from these diverse lines of research, we suggest that the sovereignshield phenomenon has been under-studied because it falls both within and
between these broad bodies of scholarship.370
It is possible, of course, to argue that opening government contractors up
to legal liability and oversight will undermine efficiency, increase cost, and
lower productivity. Presumably, contractors will either raise their prices to
account for liability risk and increased regulatory costs or exit the market
366. For a devastating analysis, see Jon D. Michaels, We the Shareholders: Government Market

367.
368.

369.

370.

Participation in the Postliberal U.S. Political Economy, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 465, 487-88
(2020). Michaels describes a “historically unpopular and legally and morally
compromised presidential Administration . . . [that] pushe[d] the concept of businesslike
government down to the bottom of whatever slippery slope of corruption and
ineptitude we previously thought unreachable.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
We do not attempt to determine the optimal level of enforcement, but we note that the
net effect of contractor impunity is a reduction in the degree of protection for consumers.
For example, Steven Kelman holds up the contract between the Department of
Education and agencies that collect student-loan debt as a model of oversight and
government control. See Kelman, supra note 255, at 184. He notes approvingly that the
Department of Education has a number of accountability levers built into the contract.
Id. Although such an argument speaks to the outsourcing critique that contractors take
advantage of an agency “asleep at the wheel,” it does not address the problem of the
powerful alliance created between the executive branch and its contractors.
For a thorough literature review, incorporating constitutional scholarship,
administrative law scholarship, consumer law scholarship, and First Amendment
scholarship, see Elengold & Glater, supra note 6 (manuscript at Part II).
Id.
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altogether.371 We acknowledge that possibility.372 We do not propose an ideal
toward which courts, legislators, and regulators should strive in the future, nor
do we claim to have unearthed a hitherto unrecognized baseline that could
guide those institutions in determining the proper balance in a particular case.
Those goals are beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, we identify the
consequences of the expanding sovereign shield and its related alliance: injured
consumers left with no legal redress and the destabilization of longstanding
federalism and separation-of-powers principles.
B. Lack of Redress
When the sovereign shield expands, avenues for consumer redress shrink.
As shown in the student-loan servicing context,373 government contractors
use the sovereign shield to evade state regulation, federal oversight, and
liability under state and federal law. By exploiting preemption and immunity
defenses, the servicers and their advocates seek to extend the sovereign shield
to protect themselves from judicial and legislative review of their practices.
When it works, consumers are left without redress, even when they have been
victims of fraud, misrepresentation, or other illegal practices.374 Borrowers
cannot even rely on the traditional flexibility available to consumers in a free
market: They cannot choose or change their assigned servicer.375 This leads to
371. Cf. Kelman, supra note 255, at 185 (raising similar concerns with respect to applying the

Freedom of Information Act to government contractors).
372. Such risks are clearly laid out in the scholarship on government contracting and

accountability. See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Publicization, and Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 154 (2005) (“When
regulation means prices rise to a level at which a contractor cannot make a profit and
perform the work for less than government workers can, there is no point in
privatizing.”).
373. See supra Part II.B.
374. See, e.g., Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the “plaintiffs’
claims challenging the language in Sallie Mae’s billing statements and coupon books
are restyled improper-disclosure claims and are therefore subject to express
preemption under” the federal Higher Education Act).
375. Student Loan Borrower Assistance: Dealing with Servicers, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR.,
https://perma.cc/HY3T-UC34 (archived Feb. 9, 2021). Student borrowers may,
however, move to a different servicer if they consolidate federal student loans
managed by multiple servicers or if they refinance with a private lender outside of the
federal student-aid regime. See Consolidating Your Federal Education Loans Can Simplify
Your Payments, But It Also Can Result in the Loss of Some Benefits, FED. STUDENT AID,
https://perma.cc/3UC3-EWJR (archived Feb. 9, 2021) (noting that upon consolidation,
a borrower may end up with a new servicer); Elyssa Kirkham, Hate Your Federal Student
Loan Servicer? Here’s What You Can Do, STUDENT LOAN HERO (updated Dec. 23, 2019),
https://perma.cc/VB7X-NYCZ (recognizing that refinancing federal loans into a new
private loan comes with a new servicer). In the former case, the borrower may not
choose who the servicer is. See Consolidating Your Federal Education Loans Can Simplify
footnote continued on next page
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a situation in which the only entity that can hold a government contractor
accountable is the very agency with whom it has contracted376—and which in
this context has supported contractors’ assertions of invulnerability.
Even when contractors lose their individual battles,377 confusion and
conflation of the sovereign-shield doctrines benefit the government contractors
and their agency partners to the detriment of consumers and their state
advocates. This is the case for three reasons. First, no ruling precludes future
application of these well-established and powerful doctrines, meaning that
defendants can time and again argue that a state’s law is preempted, for example,
notwithstanding court decisions finding otherwise.378 As a result, well-resourced
servicers can repeatedly make the same arguments, emphasizing different facts,

Your Payments, supra. In the latter, the borrower chooses the lender and could
conceivably take into account who will actually service the loan when deciding
whether to refinance. See Kirkham, supra.
376. Even then, agency accountability through contract is not a clear or easy path. See
Brown, supra note 1, at 502 (explaining that an agency can sue its contractor for breach
of contract under the Contract Disputes Act, “but successful litigation requires clear
and enforceable contract terms and sufficient agency resources and motivation to
monitor performance and pursue claims”).
377. See, e.g., Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 955 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir.
2020); Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2019). As
an analytical matter, we believe there is significant evidence that student-loan
servicers would fail to meet the majority of the five factors identified in Part I. First,
the Higher Education Act does expressly preempt disclosure notifications in 20 U.S.C.
§ 1098g. Under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, however, we would
argue that Congress did not intend any other provisions to preempt state law. Second,
student-loan servicers under contract with the federal government are not
government-created entities; they are primarily profit-motivated companies with
portfolios that go beyond their government contracts, presumably chosen because of
their corporate structure and expertise. See, e.g., Nelnet, Inc., supra note 260, item 1, at 35 (describing the diverse nature of this publicly traded company, including its federal
servicing segment and the company’s loan portfolio). Third, the Department of
Education itself has noted the risk of variation when decisions are entrusted to the
discretion of contractors. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 259 (“The
current loan servicing environment, which Next Gen will replace, features nine
different servicers operating on four different platforms, which can lead to customer
confusion and inconsistent operations for the federal student loan programs. . . .
Current loan servicing contracts also allow wide latitude in how servicers manage
accounts, including staffing their own contact centers, crafting borrower outreach
campaigns, and training customer service representatives.”).
378. Issue preclusion does not necessarily prevent a defendant from recycling the same
arguments in case after case. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 277,
293 (3d Cir. 2020) (rejecting the defendant servicer’s argument, based on the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010), that one provision
of the federal Higher Education Act preempted state consumer-protection law on the
specific facts of the case); Lawson-Ross, 955 F.3d at 919 (rejecting the same argument
made by a different defendant).
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in different tribunals.379 Second, contractors are repeat players in this field. The
great majority of federal student-loan dollars are serviced by three primary
companies, and these three companies are joined with other servicers in a
membership organization.380 This market domination means that the servicers
can take advantage of their collective experience to exploit the law to their
benefit. Finally, because contractors are allied with the federal government, they
can take advantage of the sovereign shield to evade liability in court while at the
same time escaping accountability to state and federal lawmakers.381 This lack of
accountability leaves injured consumers without redress and also eliminates a
lever to deter future bad conduct.
It is the inconsistency and incoherence of the doctrines—as set out in
Part I—that permit the private servicers to march on, continue to fight, ignore
distinctions among sovereign-shield defenses, claim the benefits of “federalness,” and kick the can down the road. While each case is litigated, consumers
lose and the balance of power shifts against them. Katharina Pistor has
described a similar dynamic in a different context: how capital is created
(“coded”) in the law.382 She uses Myriad Genetics’ breast-cancer-susceptibilitygene (BRCA) patent as an example. Although the 1994 BRCA patent, as a DNAonly patent, was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 2013,383 Pistor details
how Myriad made $2 billion dollars selling its patented tests between 1997 and
379. See supra note 378. Further, a defendant may attempt to emphasize particular facts to

380.

381.
382.
383.

argue, for example, that the state law basis of a claim constitutes a disclosure
requirement, subject to preemption. See, e.g., Chae, 593 F.3d at 942-43 (concluding that
“[a]t bottom, the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims are improper-disclosure claims”
and noting that a disclosure that is proper under federal law “cannot simultaneously be
misleading under state law, for state disclosure law is preempted by the federal
statutory and regulatory scheme”).
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 260, at 6 (reporting that “[a]s of September 30, 2017,
[the office of Federal Student Aid of the Department of Education] was responsible for
about $1.147 trillion of federally held student loans,” $950 billion of which “was
assigned to four servicers—PHEAA ($319 billion), Great Lakes ($236 billion), Navient
($215 billion), and Nelnet ($180 billion)”). Great Lakes has since been acquired by
Nelnet. See Press Release, Nelnet, supra note 260. The Student Loan Servicing
Association claims all nine contractors servicing the “vast majority” of federal loans as
members. An Examination of State Efforts to Oversee the $1.5 Trillion Student Loan Servicing
Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of C. Tapscott “Scott” Buchanan, Executive
Director, Student Loan Servicing Alliance), https://perma.cc/UR9X-5ZRW (“The vast
majority of . . . federal loans are currently serviced by nine contractors to the
Department [of Education], all of whom are SLSA members.”).
See Sabatino, supra note 1, at 187 (“Private companies are not chosen by voters to
undertake public functions. They are hired, not elected.”).
KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND
INEQUALITY 114, 126-31 (2019).
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013).
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2013, and how it capitalized on its market share and data generation to
continue to generate profits even after its patent was invalidated.384 Pistor’s
exposition of the benefits flowing to Myriad and its cohort can be applied to
other consumer-law scenarios:
Policing the boundaries of private law is a constant battle, and a costly one. The
players with the best access to the code’s masters push existing boundaries of the
code’s modules to bestow yet another claim of know-how with durable priority
rights that are shielded against the world. They are betting that they will not be
challenged, at least not too soon. Time works in their favor, because even if they
fail to convince a future court that their specific coding strategy should be upheld,
they have likely reaped a lot of wealth in the meantime. . . . In sum, the code of
capital benefits from law’s indeterminacy, from private autonomy that makes the
modules of the code highly malleable devices in the hands of sophisticated
lawyers, and from the fact that aggressive coders can play offense and exploit
first-mover advantages.385

Like Myriad, the student-loan servicers are first-movers and repeat
players that can force challengers to fight state statute by state statute. Costly
fights and doctrinal incoherence operate to the benefit of the servicers and
limit avenues of redress for injured consumers. In enabling these outcomes, the
expansion of the sovereign shield tilts the balance of power away from states
and consumers, on the one hand, and toward the federal government and its
private contractors, on the other. And it reinforces the alliance between
corporate America and the executive branch of the federal government. That
alliance in turn has significant effects on the fragile balance of power between
the federal government, states, corporations, and consumers.
C. Destabilization of Structural Principles
The sovereign shield arises from the Supremacy Clause.386 Yet it is also in
tension with two other, critical constitutional principles: federalism and the
separation of powers. Expansion of the sovereign shield enables private actors
to evade state law and regulation and undermine and destabilize the balance of
power between states and the federal government. Similarly, expansion to
evade federal law and oversight can undermine and destabilize the balance of
power between the executive and legislative branches.

384. PISTOR, supra note 382, at 114, 127. Pistor notes that Myriad attributed 74% of its 2017

earnings ($771 million) to hereditary-cancer testing. Id. at 114.
385. Id. at 215.
386. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which

shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”);
see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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1.

Federalism

There is no generally accepted method to determine the proper balance of
power between the states and the federal government387 or between consumers
and corporations.388 Indeed, such questions are among the most fiercely debated
in the legal academy, as well as in the courts.389 We do not join the scholarly
debate over the ideal allocation of power. Rather, we argue that a shift in the
balance has dangerous consequences for consumers and individual citizens. And
relatedly, we contend that the benefits of federalism are undermined by a broad
application of the sovereign shield to government contractors.390
Federalism matters391 in this context primarily because it protects
individuals’ private rights, specifically by combatting a self-interested federal
government captured by a self-interested majority, and by pursuing the
diffusion of power.392 The alliance of government contractors and federal
agencies increases the likelihood that the federal government will be co-opted
387. Federalism itself is “a system for allocation of democratic decision making power.”

388.

389.

390.

391.

392.

Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1507 (1987) (book review); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Response, Preemption Deals:
Response to Robert Mikos, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 226, 227 (2017) (“[E]ven calculating the
‘optimal’ level of across-the-board preemption would entail daunting difficulties given
the many domains across which the national and state governments interact.”).
VERKUIL, supra note 1, at 8-9 (“[T]he goal is to balance the two positives of the private
and public sectors—efficiency and accountability—in ways that confirm rather than
threaten our legal and political traditions.”). Not surprisingly, Verkuil does not specify
what the proper balance might be and instead suggests that at least sometimes, the
context should determine the outcome. See, e.g., id. at 9.
See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 257-58 (analyzing the modern
preemption doctrine within the context of federalism).
See id. at 263 (recognizing that preemption “has the potential to alter . . . vital
dynamics,” including the states’ “important regulatory responsibilities and government
functions that touch the daily lives of their citizens”).
See generally McConnell, supra note 387, at 1492-512. McConnell reminds us that our
federalist system originally sought to “promote three complementary objectives”: to
secure the public good, to protect private rights, and to preserve the spirit and
form of popular government. Id. at 1492. He further identifies nine major themes of
federalism: (1) responsiveness to diverse interests and preferences; (2) destructive
competition for the benefits of government; (3) innovation and competition in
government; (4) liberty through mobility; (5) self-interested government; (6) diffusion
of power; (7) enforcement of laws; (8) nature of representation; and (9) publicspiritedness. Id. at 1493-510.
See id. at 1501 (recognizing that the civil rights acts, the criminal-procedure revolution,
the federal standardization of liberties under the Bill of Rights, and statutorily created
rights in the welfare-regulatory state have thrust the federal government into the role
of the “primary protector of individual liberties”). It is also why we would argue that
federal regulation and oversight should be a floor of protection, but that states should
be permitted to act further in consumers’ interests.
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and influenced by private industry.393 Because states are ostensibly more
responsive to direct popular control,394 a key tenet of federalism is threatened
by the alignment of the executive branch and private industry behind an
expanded sovereign shield.
The extension of the sovereign shield to federal contractors achieves a
shift in the balance of power between the federal government and the states,
but it does so neither directly (through explicit congressional effort to
command or curtail state action) nor consistently (because not all contractors
assert the shield in order to protect themselves from state law). Rather, it does
so in individual lawsuits against private actors, brought by private citizens or
state attorneys general. When PHEAA argues that states’ efforts to use their
traditional consumer-protection powers are preempted by the Higher
Education Act,395 for example, the action quietly undermines traditional police
powers.396 And when student-loan servicers assert immunity against state
borrower bills of rights, they further chip away at state authority.
2.

Separation of powers

While limiting states’ abilities to enact and enforce laws and regulations
raises federalism concerns, exploitation of the sovereign shield to escape
federal law and oversight raises a separation-of-powers concern.397
393. See supra Part II.C; see also JOHN J. CORSON, BUSINESS IN THE HUMANE SOCIETY 73-74

394.

395.

396.

397.

(1971) (“[Post-war contracting] has been described as ‘the greatest desocialization that
this country has experienced.’ It has established a ‘new form of Federalism,’ i.e., a
‘federation’ through which the federal government gets work done in association with
private enterprise.”).
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 387, at 1509 (“One of the principal arguments for
substantial state autonomy was that representatives in a smaller unit of government
will be closer to the people.”). Some scholars argue that this is not necessarily the case.
See, e.g., Seifter, supra note 23, at 110 (arguing that state government is not actually
closer to the people). However, in the case of student-loan servicers, the attorneys
general in some states have asserted state law claims in an effort to protect their
consumers. See supra notes 262-63 (listing lawsuits against servicers, including suits
brought by state attorneys general).
See, e.g., California ex rel. Comm’r of Bus. Oversight v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency, No. 20-cv-03150, 2020 WL 5877669, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2020) (holding
California’s Student Loan Servicing Act preempted by the federal Higher Education
Act), appeal filed, No. 20-17266 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2020).
Consumer protection is traditionally considered part of the state police power. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also Greenwood Tr. Co. v. Massachusetts, 971
F.2d 818, 828 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing “consumer protection” as a “subject[] over which
the states have traditionally exercised their police powers”); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that “the protection of consumers
from unfair practices is a traditional state police power function”).
See Michaels, supra note 6, at 731-33 (explaining how privatization workarounds raise
separation-of-powers concerns).
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Government contractors’ attempts to use their relationship with the sovereign
to avoid liability under federal law and oversight by federal agencies and
congressional committees raise serious concerns about the allocation of power
between the executive and legislative branches.398
While a critical principle for our constitutional government, separation of
powers is “neither doctrinaire nor rigid.”399 As a Ninth Circuit panel has
identified, there are two primary separation-of-powers purposes: (1) to
“prevent . . . [a] dangerous concentration of power in one branch”;400 and (2) “as
a practical measure to facilitate administration of a large nation by the
assignment of numerous labors to designated authorities.”401 Courts have
further recognized the importance of the separation of powers to constrain
government actors.402
Because the sovereign shield enables an alliance between the executive
branch and corporations to the detriment of individual rights and liberties, we
are particularly concerned with the concentration of power in one branch.403
And because executive agencies may enter into government contracts and
support their contractors in the effort to escape oversight and liability,404 we
focus our attention on the executive branch. If a federal statute sets out
restrictions on telephone solicitations, a contractor’s ability to use the
sovereign shield to avoid liability for violating that statute would undermine
congressional intent. If a congressional oversight committee seeks to call a
government-contractor witness to understand potential problems with the
contractor’s actions, the contractor’s ability to borrow the protection of the
398. See Brown, supra note 1, at 519 (noting that it is appropriate, after a “fair reading of the

399.
400.
401.

402.

403.

404.

constitutional text,” to “consider whether, in assigning federal powers to nonfederal
actors, Congress is handicapping another branch from performing its respective
constitutional role”).
Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 421 (9th Cir. 1980), aff ’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Id. at 422.
Id. at 423. Yet some scholars have found that the application of separation-of-powers
principles over time has not been so consistent or clear. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D.
Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 352, 408
(2016) (describing judicial sensitivity to what the authors call a “thick political
surround,” a “jostling array of lobbyists, political party structures, media actors, and
domestic and foreign interest groups” affecting the conduct of each branch of
government (emphasis omitted)).
See, e.g., Chadha, 634 F.2d at 433-34 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison))
(“[T]he framers deemed it necessary not only to design checks on [legislative] power by
means of the other branches, but also to use the internal check of bicameralism.”).
See Michaels, supra note 6, at 766 (“The executive stands to benefit vis-à-vis the other
principals from outsourcing arrangements that expand executive authority and
enhance unilateral policy discretion.”).
For examples of such collaboration, see notes 271, 334 and the accompanying text
above.
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sovereign shield to avoid answering such questions undermines congressional
power and authority.405
Further, if a federal statute authorizes one federal agency to regulate or
supervise certain conduct, there is a potential separation-of-powers problem
when another agency affirmatively directs its contractors to evade such
oversight and supervision.406 Jason Marisam’s work on the interagency
marketplace suggests that this a very real concern.407 Marisam considers
whether executive agencies should be permitted to redelegate authority
amongst themselves to promote efficiency.408 While arguing for increased
authority for such interagency redelegation, Marisam recognizes certain risks
affecting the separation of powers. Specifically, he calls attention to a risk of
redelegation during times of divided government and when redelegation
effects a transfer of authority from an independent agency to a dependent
agency.409 In the context of student-loan servicers, there was an effort to
reduce or eliminate the regulatory authority of an independent agency (the
CFPB) in favor of a dependent agency (the Department of Education) in a time
of divided government.410
The expansion of the sovereign shield also undermines the separation-ofpowers goal of preventing a dangerous concentration of power.411 As Justice
Brandeis put it:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787,
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The
purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction

405. See supra notes 318-20 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the sovereign-

406.

407.
408.
409.
410.

411.

shield rationale by PHEEA’s CEO to avoid appearing before the House Education
Committee).
See, e.g., supra notes 316-17, 333 and accompanying text (discussing how the Secretary of
Education directed student-loan servicers to evade oversight and supervision by the
CFPB).
See Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 929 (2012).
Id. at 927-29.
Id. at 928-29.
The Supreme Court has limited the independence of the CFPB on separation-ofpowers grounds. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192
(2020) (“[T]he structure of the CFPB violates the separation of powers . . . [but] the CFPB
Director’s removal protection is severable from the other statutory provisions bearing
on the CFPB’s authority. The agency may therefore continue to operate, but its
Director, in light of our decision, must be removable by the President at will.”).
See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth Presidency and
Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454, 1474-75 (2009) (arguing that executive agencies’
overlapping responsibilities and independent agencies’ “insulation from presidential (and
hence democratic) control” raise separation-of-powers problems and deserve scrutiny).
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incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy.412

In the absence of federal oversight and supervision, we are left, again, with
a single, potentially interested entity able to hold private entities accountable
for performance of a public service they have been contracted to provide. That
entity, of course, is the very agency in contract, partnership, and alliance with
the contractor.
Conclusion
In this Article, we have raised serious concerns about the extent to which
private companies may shield themselves from liability, regulation, and
oversight because of their contractual relationship with the federal
government. Using student-loan servicers as a case study, this Article has
identified the ways that contractors have exploited three doctrines—federal
preemption, derivative sovereign immunity, and intergovernmental
immunity—that form what we label a sovereign shield to liability and
oversight. And the Article has warned that the successful deployment of this
shield to immunize private contractors enables an alliance between private
industry and the executive branch of the federal government. That alliance
simultaneously effects a shift in the balance of power between states and the
federal government, between the executive and legislative branches, and
between consumers and businesses.
These shifts may have profound consequences given the extent to which
the federal government relies on private companies to perform essential
functions, from compensating jurors to servicing student loans. Consumers
may be left with no remedy for harms if executive agencies choose not to
exercise their authority, the executive may operate under reduced legislative
oversight, and private businesses may operate without fear of state consumerprotection laws. Yet all of this happens quietly and slowly, with little fanfare.
For this reason, the doctrines that constitute the sovereign shield demand
scrutiny and aggressive limits, to prevent fundamental shifts in balances of
power that threaten the public good.

412. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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